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Many criminal theorists say that we have a “compatibilist” criminal 
law, by which they mean that in our criminal law a person can deserve 
punishment for her acts even if she does not have “genuinely” free will.  
This conception of the criminal law harbors and is driven by a secret 
politics, one that resists social change and idealizes the existing social 
order.  In this Article, I map this secret politics.  In so doing, I call into 
question the descriptive accuracy of the compatibilist account of the 
criminal law, and set the stage for a franker discussion of criminal 
punishment—one that recognizes that the perpetual struggle to say just 
who “deserves” punishment is driven as much by brute politics and the 
competition to allocate power and resources in society as by any 




It is sometimes said that our criminal law takes the “weak 
retributivist” view that an actor should not be punished unless she 
deserves to be punished.1  Since there is no desert without responsibility,2 
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 1. Some theorists go further and argue that the criminal law adopts the “strong retributivist” 
principle that an actor must be punished if he deserves to be punished (while still holding that an 
actor cannot be punished if he does not deserve punishment).  Other criminal theorists, including 
consequentialist theorists, say the criminal law does not follow any version of the retributivist 
principle.  Still others take no position on this issue at all.  On the various positions, see MICHAEL 
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 83–94 (1997), describing 
theories of the criminal law’s function, and Michael Corrado, The Abolition of Punishment, 35 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 257, 262–66 (2001), describing hybrid theories.  Because I believe that 
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those who say we have a retributivist criminal law must also say 
something about how the law determines responsibility.  One especially 
notorious problem here has to do with whether an actor must have 
“genuine” free will in order to be held responsible: if an actor was caused 
to act by forces beyond her control—e.g., if nature, nurture, 
circumstances, or some combination thereof, drove her inexorably to her 
act—will the criminal law hold her responsible? 
Some criminal theorists say it will not: on their view, the criminal 
law takes the “originationist” approach, according to which an actor is 
not responsible for an act unless she was the original or ultimate cause of 
the act.3  Other theorists say the law may hold her responsible for her act: 
on their view, the criminal law takes the “compatibilist” approach, 
                                                                                                                       
commitment to retributive principles provides especially effective legitimating cover for state 
violence, I am skeptical of theories that downplay the role of retribution in contemporary criminal 
law.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 2. Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
115, 115–16 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000). 
 3. The term originationism is not widely used, but “origination” language is becoming more 
common.  See, e.g., DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 4 (2001) (“[A] claim about 
origination . . . might be formulated as follows . . . an agent is not morally responsible for [a] 
decision if it is produced by a source over which she has no control.”); Michael Corrado, 
Automatism and the Theory of Action, 39 EMORY L.J. 1191, 1192, 1212 (1990) (using origination 
language in discussion of voluntariness); Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate 
in Capital Sentencing: Darrow’s Defense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1019–21 
(1994) (same); Michael McKenna, Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-
Responsibility, 38 AM. PHIL. Q. 37, 40 (2001) (“[I]f determinism is true, and agent’s actions do not 
originate in her.”); Derk Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, in FREE WILL 243, 245 n.7 (Derk 
Pereboom ed., 1997) (“[C]ompatibilists ignore a widespread attitude about our actions, that moral 
responsibility presupposes origination, or agent causation.”); Gary Watson, Responsibility and the 
Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE 
EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 256, 282 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) 
(“[U]nless consent were undetermined, we would not truly be originators of our deeds.  We would 
be merely products, and not, as it were, producers.”); Roy C. Weatherford, Compatibilism and 
Incompatibilism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 144, 144 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995) 
(“The incompatibilist defends his view by arguing that a free act must involve . . . the freedom to 
choose called origination.”). 
Other terms have been used to identify the origination requirement.  See, e.g., PEREBOOM, 
supra, at 54 (referring to the concept as the “causal history principle”); Susan L. Hurley, Debate: 
Luck, Responsibility, and the ‘Natural Lottery’, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 79, 82 (2002) (“[L]ack of control of 
causes is incompatible with responsibility,” and “responsibility requires ‘regressive control.’”); 
Anders Kaye, Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses, 83 NEB. L.  REV. 1116, 1117 (2005) 
(calling “the moral principle that actors cannot be blamed for conduct caused by forces beyond their 
control” the “control principle”); Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY § 1, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/moral-luck (“[C]ontrol principle” 
holds that “we are morally assessable only to the extent that what we are assessed for depends on 
factors under our control.”). 
Whatever term is used, the underlying principle is well-known.  It is implicit in “hard 
determinism,” also known as “incompatibilism” (the view that moral responsibility is incompatible 
with absolute determinism and that absolute determinism is true), Weatherford, supra, at 144, and 
libertarianism (the view that moral responsibility is inconsistent with absolute determinism, and that 
absolute determinism is false), Derk Pereboom, Introduction to FREE WILL, supra, at vii. 
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according to which genuine free will is not a prerequisite for 
responsibility and a person can be held responsible for her act even if it 
was caused by forces beyond her control.4  Once, it was common for 
criminal theorists to say that the criminal law takes the originationist 
approach to responsibility.  Today, however, it is more common to say 
we have a compatibilist criminal law. 
This Article interrogates the compatibilist account of the criminal 
law.  It does so in a very particular way.  It does not directly challenge 
the descriptive accuracy of the compatibilist account, though there might 
be grounds for doing so;5 nor does it directly argue that compatibilism is 
“wrong” on the merits, though this might be possible too.6  Rather, this 
Article looks into the politics of the compatibilist criminal law.  It 
contends that compatibilist and originationist criminal laws have 
different sorts of consequences for the allocation of power and resources 
in our society.  I bring out these consequences to show the extent to 
which the compatibilist theory of the criminal law allies itself with a 
particular politics, and, in so doing, to encourage a more worldly debate 
about the meaning of criminal desert. 
Part II sets the stage by describing the originationist and 
compatibilist accounts of the criminal law.  Part III lays the foundation 
for the political critique.  This Part compares the originationist and 
compatibilist approaches to responsibility and shows that compatibilists 
are less likely to attend to the ways hard social conditions (like poverty, 
inequality, and discrimination) influence human conduct.  Part IV shows 
that this difference has political consequences in the context of the 
criminal law.  Because originationism and compatibilism have such 
different attitudes toward hard social conditions, societies taking the 
compatibilist approach to criminal law will allocate power and resources 
differently than societies taking the originationist approach.  As Part 
IV.A shows, a compatibilist criminal law is more likely to reinforce the 
existing social order.  Its disregard for hard social conditions will disrupt 
popular recognition of the links between social conditions and crime, 
leaving citizens less likely to conceive and articulate challenges to the 
social order.  Moreover, as Part II.B explains, a compatibilist criminal 
law is more conducive to the state’s use of violence in defense of the 
social order.  While originationist and compatibilist criminal laws both 
give the state broad authority to engage in the form of state violence 
                                                     
 4. Among those who adopt this view, there is, of course, great debate about what criteria 
should be used to determine the actor’s responsibility.  See infra Part II.B. 
 5. See infra Part II.C. 
 6. Id. 
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known as punishment, compatibilism’s disregard for hard social 
conditions makes it more likely to approve the infliction of such violence 
on the socially disadvantaged, legitimating the use of state violence to 
disempower those at the bottom of the social order and to suppress their 
criticism of and resistance to the status quo. 
The secret politics of the compatibilist criminal law, then, is that it is 
calibrated to defuse pressure for social change and to facilitate violent 
enforcement of the status quo.  Having brought out this hidden politics, 
Part V proposes a new approach to the debate about criminal desert—an 
approach that is less likely to harbor such secrets.  When participants in 
this reoriented debate say who they expect to see punished, they should 
identify the punished not just in the politically opaque language of 
responsibility, but also by reference to the role and status of the punished 
in the social order.  They should say how their approach to desert will 
influence the allocation of resources and power in society.  And they 
should say why we should desire or approve a society that allocates 
resources and power in the way they recommend. 
II. CRIMINAL THEORY’S PREFERENCE FOR COMPATIBILIST CRIMINAL 
LAW 
Many contemporary criminal theorists make the descriptive claim 
that we have a retributivist criminal law, in which an actor cannot be 
punished for an act unless he is morally responsible for that act.  To flesh 
this claim out, however, criminal theorists must say something about 
how the criminal law determines moral responsibility.  Here, theorists 
commonly say the criminal law determines responsibility by looking to 
aspects of the actor’s choice, attitude, or character.7  But a complete 
retributivist account must also say something more: it must say what 
position the law takes on the notoriously difficult question of whether an 
actor will be held responsible for committing an act even if he did not act 
with “genuine” free will.8 
There are two conventional answers here.  The criminal law can take 
the originationist approach, in which an actor cannot be responsible for 
an act unless he acted with “genuine” free will, meaning that he—and 
                                                     
 7. Regarding choice, attitude, and character theories, see infra notes 54–65 and accompanying 
text.  It is not just retributivists who invoke the familiar frameworks of choice, attitude, and character 
theory; there are consequentialist flavors of these theories too.  Consequentialists, however, are not 
directly confronted with the compatibilism-originationism question. 
 8. Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, 82 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 465, 468–69 (1991). 
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not some force beyond his control—was the original or ultimate cause of 
his act.  Alternatively, the criminal law can take the compatibilist 
approach, in which an actor can be held responsible for an act even if he 
did not “originate” it, so long as certain other criteria (having nothing to 
do with “genuine” free will) are satisfied.  In our daily lives, many of us 
look like originationists—we talk as though we would excuse actors if 
we were convinced their acts were caused by forces beyond their control.  
Nevertheless, many criminal theorists say the criminal law takes the 
compatibilist approach: they say that, in our criminal law, it is no excuse 
that an act was caused by forces beyond the actor’s control. 
To set the stage for the political critique of the compatibilist criminal 
law, this Part describes the originationist and compatibilist accounts of 
the criminal law.  The Parts that follow will explain why which sort of 
criminal law we have matters. 
A. The Originationist Account of the Criminal Law 
On one view, the criminal law takes an originationist approach to 
responsibility.  Originationism holds that an actor is only responsible for 
an act if she acted with “genuine”9 “free will,” such that her act 
“originated” with her,10 rather than with forces or circumstances beyond 
her control.11  The same idea is at work when we say that a person cannot 
be responsible unless she has “metaphysical,”12 “transcendental,”13 or 
                                                     
 9. See P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 72, 74 (Gary Watson ed., 2d 
ed. 2003) (using this language but rejecting the view it describes). 
 10. For sources using the origination formulation, see supra note 3. 
 11. See DANIEL DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM 76 (1984) (noting that “[w]e want to be able to say of 
ourselves, as Harry Truman famously said, ‘the buck stops here,’” but rejecting the origination 
requirement); Michael Corrado, Addiction and Causation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 913, 915 (2000) 
(“If there is an unbroken causal history for a certain action, extending back to some event over which 
the agent had no control, then the agent is not (morally) responsible for that action.” (internal 
footnote omitted)); Corrado, supra note 3, at 1201, 1225 (“I am responsible only for those things that 
are up to me; to be responsible, I must have some say in the matter.  But I have no say in the matter 
of caused action.”  For an actor to be responsible for an act, “the volition . . . that leads to the 
behavior must be the first event in a causal chain . . . and must itself be uncaused.”); Richard 
Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe 
Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 55 (1985) (“[B]lame is inappropriate when a 
defendant’s criminal behavior is caused by extrinsic factors beyond his or her control.”); Robert 
Kane, Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF FREE WILL 3, 5 (Robert Kane ed., 2002) (“[W]e believe we have free will when . . . the origin or 
source of our choices and actions is in us and not in anyone or anything else over which we have no 
control.”). 
 12. Watson, supra note 3, at 281–82. 
 13. See R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 13 (1994) 
(associating this expression with Kant). 
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“contra-causal”14 free will, or that she must be the “ultimate” cause or 
source of her act,15 or that her act must be “governable by her self ad 
infinitum,”16 or that she must have “regressive”17 or “ultimate control”18 
over her act, or that she must “will” her act “without being caused to will 
it.”19  All these formulations gesture at the same thing: a person is only 
responsible for an act if she originates that act.  If the act was caused by 
something—some force, event, or condition—beyond the actor’s control, 
she is not responsible. 
The moral intuition that animates originationism has been explained 
and evoked in a variety of ways.  Academic philosophers sometimes 
state the intuition as though it were fundamental: “if an action results 
from a deterministic causal process that traces back to factors beyond the 
control of the agent, he is not morally responsible for the action.”20  The 
intuition can also be evoked with a “transfer” argument, which 
emphasizes that if we are not responsible for the past and the laws of 
nature, and not responsible for the fact that the past and the laws of 
nature entail a particular future consequence, our “non-responsibility” 
should transfer to the future consequence as well.21  More colloquially, 
“if agents’ acts are caused by factors for which they are not responsible, 
then how can they be morally responsible for acting as a result of those 
factors?”;22 and if an actor is to be blamed for his conduct, he “should be 
ultimately responsible . . . ‘ultimately’ in the sense that nothing for which 
                                                     
 14. Strawson, supra note 9, at 92; MOORE, supra note 1, at 597. 
 15. See PEREBOOM, supra note 3, at xv (“[M]oral responsibility requires actions to have . . . 
causal histories that make agents ultimate sources of their actions.”); see also McKenna, supra note 
3, at 40–41 (describing the “ultimacy condition,” which holds that a person is not responsible for her 
acts if she is not the “ultimate source” of her acts). 
 16. SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 34–35 (1990). 
 17. See S.L. HURLEY, JUSTICE, LUCK, AND KNOWLEDGE 17, 111 (2003) (describing the 
regression requirement, stating that “to be responsible for something you must be responsible for its 
causes,” thus, “[r]egressive control of X requires control of X’s causes as well as of X itself”).  
Hurley rejects the notion that regressive control is required for moral responsibility.  Id. at 80–105. 
 18. See WOLF, supra note 16, at 10 (describing, but not endorsing, the view that “there is a 
requirement that the agent’s control be ultimate—her will must be determined by her self, and her 
self must not, in turn, be determined by anything external to itself”).  Paul Russell refers to the 
“capacity for ultimate control.”  Paul Russell, Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the New Compatibilism, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra note 11, at 229, 248. 
 19. Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 78 n.83 
(2005); see also Corrado, supra note 3, at 1192 (“Actions are not voluntary unless they are up to the 
actor, and actions that are caused by prior condition are not up to the actor.”). 
 20. See Pereboom, supra note 3, at 246. 
 21. See McKenna, supra note 3, at 41–48 (describing and refining transfer-style arguments). 
 22. MARTHA KLEIN, DETERMINISM, BLAMEWORTHINESS, AND DEPRIVATION 50 (1990); see 
also Corrado, supra note 11, at 915 (using similar formulation); Corrado, supra note 3, at 1201, 
1225 (same). 
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[he was] not responsible should be the source of ‘his conduct.’”23  
Another approach is to crystallize the intuition through a “manipulation” 
argument, which first reminds us that we would not hold a person 
responsible if he were a puppet to a nefarious hypnotist or a demonic 
neurosurgeon, and then uses a series of incrementally evolving analogies 
to show that there are no morally significant differences between such a 
cleverly manipulated actor and an actor whose conduct is dictated by 
other forces beyond his control.24  Criminal theorists also sometimes say 
that this intuition is at work in the way we respond to “explanations” of 
bad acts: they point out that the more thoroughly we can explain a bad 
act, the less likely we are to blame the bad actor, and they trace this 
dynamic to implicit embrace of the origination requirement.25 
However expressed or evoked, the intuition that a person is not 
responsible for acts he did not originate is widespread and common.  
Perhaps for this reason, originationism has been extensively defended in 
the academic philosophical debate about responsibility, where it is 
associated with two traditional views of responsibility—libertarianism 
and “hard determinism”—and with the intuition that attributions of 
responsibility should not turn on “moral luck.”  Even the criminal 
theorists who most ardently criticize originationism commonly concede 
that, in our lay-lives, most of us seem to be originationists.26 
                                                     
 23. KLEIN, supra note 22, at 51; Robert Kane: Reflections on Free Will, Determinism and 
Indeterminism, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwVariousKane.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2007). 
 24. Pereboom employs this approach to powerful effect.  See PEREBOOM, supra note 3, at 1–36 
(discussing alternative possibilities and causal histories).  The characterization of the approach 
offered here is from McKenna, supra note 3, at 38–40, which discusses the Free Will Condition and 
thr Principle of Alternative Possibilities. 
 25. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1985) 
(“Common sense often adopts . . . the French proverb, ‘tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner.’  This 
common sense urges that we should excuse whenever we come to know the causes of behavior . . . 
.”); see also Watson, supra note 3, at 275–76 (suggesting that particularistic knowledge of an 
accused’s life may stir excusing impulses).  Watson, who is not a criminal theorist, describes this 
phenomenon, but does not believe that explanations of bad acts are always sufficient to inspire 
complete excuses.  Id. at 275. 
 26. See Moore, supra note 25, at 1091 (describing “common sense” impulses to excuse where 
the “causes of behavior” are known); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A 
Legal and Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 345, 347 (1998) (“Many people also seem to 
believe that ‘real’ responsibility is impossible unless people have freedom in the strongest sense.  
Unless, that is, people have genuine ‘contracausal’ freedom, are ‘prime movers unmoved,’ and the 
like . . . they cannot be ‘really’ responsible.  . . . The incompatibilist intuition that motivates critics of 
responsibility exerts a powerful hold on us, a hold that I am prey to and worries me.”).  
Compatibilist philosophers make similar points.  See WALLACE, supra note 13, at 58 (discussing 
“the persistence of incompatibilist elements in our thinking about moral responsibility,” and noting 
that “[s]tudents . . . are quite easily led to the conclusion that it would not be justifiable to hold 
people morally responsible for what they do if determinism were true”); id. at 222 (discussing the 
“widespread tendency to think about responsibility in incompatibilist terms,” and observing that 
“students are frequently drawn to incompatibilism as a kind of default position and tend to view 
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Some criminal theorists say we have an originationist criminal law.27  
According to this ostensibly descriptive claim, our criminal law 
considers it unjust and inappropriate to affix blame or inflict punishment 
on actors when their acts are caused by forces beyond their control.28  
Proponents of this view point to various features of the criminal law that 
appear to reflect an originationist approach.  For example, it is 
sometimes argued that some or all of the criminal law’s excuses reflect 
judgments that convincing causal explanations can be offered for certain 
kinds of recurring human conduct, and that actors ought to be excused in 
such cases.29  On this “causal” or “determinist” theory of the excuses, 
doctrines like the involuntary act doctrine, the irresistible impulse 
defense, duress, the (rarely codified) necessity excuse, provocation, and 
even self-defense (to the extent that self-defense has excuse-like 
features) trace certain sorts of human acts to psychological or biological 
act-generating mechanisms created and triggered by forces over which 
actors have no control.30  That is, these doctrines excuse actors for the 
originationist reason that acts caused by forces beyond the actor’s control 
should be excused. 
The originationist account of the criminal law has been criticized 
fiercely in recent years.  The most common criticisms contend that the 
originationist account has difficulty explaining many of the criminal 
law’s excuses, and that an originationist criminal law would be obligated 
to excuse every human act, which our criminal law obviously does not 
                                                                                                                       
compatibilist arguments with suspicion, as attempts to talk them out of something that is virtually 
obvious outside of the classroom”); WOLF, supra note 16, at 24 (noting the persistence of 
incompatibilist intuitions).  So do philosophers and criminal theorists sympathetic to originationist 
intuitions.  See PEREBOOM, supra note 3, at xiii (stating that “many people agree that criminals 
cannot be blameworthy for actions” caused by external influences); Corrado, supra note 11, at 916 
(defining causal theory as having an intuitive appeal following “from a principle that many find hard 
to reject”); Thomas Nagel, Freedom, in FREE WILL, supra note 9, at 229, 242 (“I can no more help 
holding myself and others responsible in ordinary life than I can help feeling that my actions 
originate with me.”).  But see HURLEY, supra note 17, at 96 (suggesting that the “regression 
condition”—related to the control principle—”is highly controversial between people because 
individuals may . . . have internally conflicting intuitions about whether responsibility must be 
regressive”). 
 27. E.g., Kaye, supra note 3, at 1126. 
 28. Among the most common theories of criminal responsibility, choice theory most easily 
accommodates the originationist view.  But it is also possible to imagine originationist flavors of 
character and attitudinal theory.  See Corrado, supra note 8, at 475–82 (describing the choice theory 
as the “inability to do otherwise” because of external constraints, and comparing the overlap 
between choice and character theory). 
 29. See Kaye, supra note 3, at 1120–23 (discussing the “causal” theory of excuses). 
 30. See id. at 1126–31 (discussing the causal explanations behind criminal law defenses); 
Moore, supra note 25, at 1095–112 (explaining the theory of excuse and the causal theory with 
regard to criminal law excuses). 
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do.31  Neither of these criticisms is as strong as it first appears.  The first 
point, for example, incorrectly assumes that in an originationist criminal 
law, all excuses would be originationist excuses.  In fact, while 
originationism mandates that nonoriginal acts be excused, it does not 
preclude excusing actors on other, nonoriginationist grounds.32  Thus, it 
may be that some of the criminal law’s excuses have originationist 
explanations, while other excuses excuse for other reasons.33  The 
problem with the second criticism—which alleges that an originationist 
criminal law would excuse every human actor—is that it assumes that 
the law subscribes to absolute determinism, according to which every 
event, including every human act, is determined.  It is true that if the law 
subscribes to absolute determinism, an originationist criminal law must 
excuse every human act (since no human act is genuinely original).34  
But the assumption that the law subscribes to absolute determinism is 
debatable: it confuses what people and the criminal law “should believe” 
(purportedly, absolute determinism, since “partial determinism” is 
philosophically “unappealing” or “implausible”35) with what people 
actually believe.  In fact, there is good reason to believe that most people, 
and the criminal law, actually subscribe to some sort of partial 
determinism.36  If this is true, then the fact that our criminal law does not 
excuse every human act is perfectly consistent with our having an 
originationist criminal law. 
The originationist account of the criminal law is, then, both plausible 
and intuitively attractive.  It gives us a criminal law that embraces the 
common intuition that a person should not be held responsible for acts 
caused by forces beyond his control, while also accepting that there may 
be other good grounds for excusing actors who have committed 
                                                     
 31. Moore, supra note 25, at 1112–49. 
 32. Kaye, supra note 3, at 1133–35. 
 33. Another problem here is that proponents of this criticism generally fail to think 
imaginatively about causal accounts of human acts, and thus fail to see that there are plausible 
originationist explanations for many complex doctrines. 
 34. See Moore, supra note 25, at 1112 (“If one accepts determinism—the doctrine that every 
event, including human actions and writings, has a cause—then it is hard to see why everyone is not 
excused for all actions.”). 
 35. See Kaye, supra note 3, at 1133 (summarizing the partial-determinism critique); Moore, 
supra note 25, at 1114–28 (criticizing partial-determinist strategies). 
 36. See Kaye, supra note 3, at 1135–57 (setting out reasons to believe that many people are 
partial determinists, notwithstanding the apparent implausibility of partial determinism).  The 
popular view may change in the future, such that universal determinism becomes the popular view.  
If, despite such change, the criminal law continues to treat some actors as deserving of punishment, 
that will disprove the originationist account of the criminal law; but I think it quite possible that if 
universal determinism becomes the popular view, the criminal law will cease to treat actors as 
deserving of punishment. 
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prohibited acts.  Such a criminal law seems appealingly familiar and 
flexible. 
B. The Compatibilist Account of the Criminal Law 
Despite the intuitive appeal of the originationist account of the 
criminal law, contemporary criminal theory generally maintains that the 
criminal law rejects the origination requirement and takes a different 
approach to evaluating responsibility—the compatibilist approach. 
Two impulses animate the compatibilist approach to responsibility.  
One is a distinctively modern attraction to causal explanations.  
Compatibilist literature persistently notes our burgeoning ability to 
explain physical phenomena in causal terms, infers that human acts can 
be explained in the same way too, and announces that our conception of 
responsibility must take this into account.37  The other impulse is an 
attraction to blame.  It is a recurring theme in the seminal compatibilist 
works that blame is an indelible part of who we are, or how our society 
works.  In this vein, David Hume wrote that “the mind of man is so 
formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain . . . actions, it 
immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame,” and asserted 
that “these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any 
philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever.”38  Two hundred years 
later, P.F. Strawson echoed Hume, declaring it “practically 
inconceivable” that we would give up blame (and other “reactive 
attitudes”),39 since our blaming practices “have common roots in our 
human nature and our membership of human communities,”40 and are 
“part of the general framework of human life, not something that can 
come up for review.”41  These “naturalistic”42 ideas appear again and 
again in compatibilist works.43  We need to blame, compatibilists often 
                                                     
 37. See Robert Kane, The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra note 11, at 9, 33 (“[D]evelopments . . . in biology, neuroscience, 
psychology, psychiatry, social and behavior sciences,” including discoveries in genetics, heredity, 
computers, and intelligent machines “have convinced many persons that more of their behavior is 
determined by causes unknown to them and beyond their control than previously believed.”). 
 38. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 111–12 (1966). 
 39. Strawson, supra note 9, at 81. 
 40. Id. at 85. 
 41. Id. at 83. 
 42. Ishtiyaque Haji calls this the “naturalistic strategy.”  Ishtiyaque Haji, Compatibilist Views of 
Freedom and Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra note 11, at 202, 206. 
 43. See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 11, at 47 (approving Strawson’s view that “abandoning the 
participant attitude is practically inconceivable”); JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, 
RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL 16–17 (1998) (invoking Strawson’s naturalistic argument, 
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suggest.  We cannot help it, and even if determinism is true, that will not 
stop us.44 
Compatibilism seeks to accommodate both these impulses at once, to 
satisfy both the attraction to causal explanation and the attraction to 
blame.  It declares that one need not negate the other—that it is possible 
to give a causal explanation of a human act that points to forces beyond 
the actor’s control while at the same time holding the human actor 
responsible.45  To achieve this result, compatibilism maintains that 
origination is not a prerequisite for responsibility, and that we actually 
use other criteria for determining responsibility.46  Thus, the founders of 
modern compatibilism—and several influential compatibilists in the first 
part of the twentieth century—maintained that the “real” question is 
whether the actor was “free from constraint,” meaning that there was no 
“external” impediment to him doing what he “willed” to do.47  If he was 
not “constrained,” he was responsible, even if what he “willed” was itself 
                                                                                                                       
maintaining that our “commitment to moral responsibility . . . is very deep,” calling our belief in 
moral responsibility a strong natural belief); PHILIP PETTIT, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 12 (2001) 
(citing Strawson, supra note 9 and WALLACE, supra note 13) (“The practice of imputing praise and 
blame . . . is not an intellectual exercise . . . .  It is written into some of our most basic reactions to 
one another . . . .  The practice is rooted deeply in the architecture of our psychology . . . .”). 
 44. Some compatibilists make more nuanced versions of this naturalist claim.  For example, 
Wallace suggests that while the impulse to blame is not natural or inevitable, it is quite likely to play 
an important role in conventional human societies.  WALLACE, supra note 13, at 32. 
 45. See Weatherford, supra note 3, at 144 (defining compatibilism as the view that “we are 
sometimes free and morally responsible even though all events are causally determined”). 
 46. There are several recent and thorough summaries of the compatibilist criteria developed in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, some of which track the emergence of these criteria 
historically.  E.g., PEREBOOM, supra note 3, at 89–126; Kane, supra note 11, at 14–36; Michael 
McKenna, Compatibilism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2004), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism. 
 47. Hobbes and Hume—founding fathers of modern compatibilism—articulated a test like this.  
See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 262 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739) (distinguishing between “the liberty of spontaneity . . . that which 
is oppos’d to violence” and “the liberty of indifference . . . a negation of necessity and causes” 
(emphasis and footnotes omitted)); HUME, supra note 38, at 103 (“By liberty . . . we . . . mean a 
power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will.  . . . [T]his hypothetical 
liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Thomas Hobbes, Of Liberty and Necessity, in HOBBES AND BRAMHALL ON LIBERTY AND 
NECESSITY 15, 38, 39 (Vere Chappell ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (1654) (“Liberty is the 
absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of 
the agent”; “a free agent is he that can do if he will and forebear if he will . . . liberty is the absence 
of external impediments.”).  So did several philosophers in the early- to mid-twentieth century.  See, 
e.g., A. J. Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, in FREE WILL, supra note 3, at 110, 115 (“If I am 
constrained, I do not act freely.”); R. E. Hobart, Free Will as Involving Determination and 
Inconceivable Without It, in FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM 63, 72–77 (Bernard Berofsky ed., 1966) 
(“The freedom of anyone surely always implies his possession of a power, and means the absence of 
any interference (whether taking the form of restraint or constraint) with his exercise of that 
power.”); Moritz Schlick, When Is a Man Responsible?, in FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM, supra, at 
54, 59–60 (“[A] man is free if he does not act under compulsion, and he is compelled or unfree when 
he is hindered from without in the realization of his natural desires.”). 
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determined for him by forces beyond his control.  More recent 
compatibilists—in and outside the legal academic literature—have recast 
the criteria for responsibility in various ways.  Some look for a certain 
kind of “mesh” in the various features of the actor’s mental economy:48 
one mesh theory holds that responsibility attaches when an actor not only 
acted as he willed, but also desired to have the will he acted on (without 
regard to the origin of the second-order desire).49  Another kind of theory 
holds actors responsible so long as their acts are produced by a 
“mechanism” (in the actor) that is “responsive to reasons” (without 
regard to why the mechanism responds in the way that it does).50  Still 
other compatibilist theories look to whether the actor has certain 
capacities, variously defined.  To be blamed, the actor must have the 
capacity “to do the right thing for the right reasons . . . to act in 
accordance with the True and the Good”;51 or, on another variant, the 
actor must be capable of “reflective self-control,”52 meaning she has the 
ability to grasp and apply “moral reasons,” and the ability to control her 
behavior in accord with those reasons.53  Each of these approaches tries 
to capture what we look for in responsible actors, and each describes it in  
 
                                                     
 48. Some theories, including Frankfurt’s, require a “hierarchical mesh,” meaning that the actor 
must not only desire to commit his act, but also desire to desire to commit his act.  Harry G. 
Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in FREE WILL, supra note 9, at 322, 
322–36.  Such theories presume that the ability to form higher order desires about our desires is what 
makes us moral beings or “persons.”  Id.  Other mesh theories require different sorts of 
synchronicities.  Gary Watson’s view is that the actor’s act must be consistent with his reasoned 
values.  See Gary Watson, Free Agency, in FREE WILL, supra note 9, at 337, 338 (examining the 
difference between wanting and valuing); see also Haji, supra note 42, at 210–25 (surveying the 
mesh theories of Harry Frankfurt, Gerald Dworkin, Gary Watson, Susan Wolf, and Hilary Bok); 
Kane, supra note 11, at 20 (summarizing Haji, supra note 42); McKenna, supra note 46, at 5.3 
(describing Frankfurt’s hierarchical mesh theory). 
 49. Frankfurt, supra note 48, at 323 (we have “first-order desires” (desires to act) and “second-
order desires” (desires about which first-order desires to act on); we are morally responsible when 
our actions are produced by a desire to act that we desired to have). 
 50. Fischer and Ravizza’s influential theory holds that “[a]n agent is morally responsible for 
performing an action insofar as the mechanism that actually issues in the action is reasons-
responsive.”  John Martin Fischer, Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility, in FREE WILL, supra 
note 3, at 214, 219; see also R.A. Duff, Who Is Responsible, for What, to Whom?, 2 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 441, 444–45 (2005) (invoking reasons-responsiveness criteria).  See generally FISCHER & 
RAVIZZA, supra note 43 (explaining that the actor’s act must be the product of a moderately reasons-
responsive mechanism for which the actor has taken responsibility).   
 51. WOLF, supra note 16, at 87.  “This ability may be roughly analyzed into two narrower 
abilities.  The first is an ability of thought, the ability to know what is in accordance with the True 
and the Good; the second is an ability of execution, the ability to convert one’s knowledge into 
action.”  Id. at 87–88 (emphasis omitted).  Provided an actor satisfies these criteria, she is 
responsible for her actions, even when she declines to embrace the True and the Good.  Id. at 88. 
 52. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 162. 
 53. Id. at 157–62. 
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a way that makes it possible for an actor to be responsible even if his act 
was caused by forces beyond his control. 
Many criminal theorists say (or assume) that the criminal law takes 
the compatibilist approach,54 weaving compatibilist criteria into the 
familiar choice, attitude, or character theories of criminal responsibility.55  
Thus, in choice theory,56 in which an actor is responsible for an act so 
long as she had both the capacity and a “fair opportunity” to choose to 
act other than she did,57 compatibilists define the relevant capacity and 
opportunity in ways that render “genuine” free will and origination 
unnecessary.  All that is required for responsibility is that the actor have 
the ability to engage in practical reasoning and not be subject to an 
immediate threat to one of her socially recognized interests (such as her 
interest in her physical safety).58  Something similar happens in 
                                                     
 54. E.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 800–01 (1975); Peter Arenella, 
Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral 
Accountability, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1511, 1614 (1992); Moore, supra note 25, at 1091; Morse, 
supra note 26, at 332; George Vuoso, Note, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 
1661, 1685 (1987). 
 55. For overviews of these theories, common in criminal theory, see MOORE, supra note 1, at 
548–93, describing choice theory and character theory, and Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of 
Excuse in Criminal Law 39–57 (The Berkeley Elec. Press, Working Paper No. 341, 2004), available 
at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/341, describing choice theory, character theory, and Westen’s 
attitudinal theory. 
While some compatibilist criminal theorists are choice theorists, attitudinal theorists, or 
character theorists, it is also possible to subscribe to these theories without being a compatibilist.  
For example, one may be a consequentialist choice theorist, attitudinal theorist, or character theorist.  
See MOORE, supra note 1, at 550 (maintaining that Hart originally gave consequentialist rationales 
for choice theory); id. at 574 (noting that Richard Brandt and Nicola Lacey offer consequentialist 
character theories); Corrado, supra note 8, at 469–70 (highlighting that choice and character theories 
can be either retributive or utilitarian).  See generally Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two 
Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996) (describing their attitude-
oriented theory as consistent with both consequentialist and retributive approaches to punishment). 
 56. MOORE, supra note 1, at 548–49 (describing and approving choice theory); Westen, supra 
note 55, at 45–54 (describing and rejecting choice theory).  Moore characterizes choice theory as a 
Kantian theory, traces its contemporary forms to Hart, and characterizes leading contemporary 
compatibilist philosopher John Martin Fischer (whose work has influenced a number of 
contemporary criminal theorists) as a choice theorist.  MOORE, supra note 1, at 549–50, 573 n.57.  
For further discussion of choice theory as a Kantian theory, see Antony Duff, Virtue, Vice, and 
Criminal Liability: Do We Want An Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 149–50 
(2002).  Westen puts Kadish in this group too.  Westen, supra note 55, at 44–46 & nn.98–102. 
 57. MOORE, supra note 1, at 548, 554.  Westen suggests that Morse takes this approach and that 
Hart sometimes did.  Westen, supra note 55, at 45 & n.100, 46–54. 
 58. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 561 (“[T]o lack a fair opportunity to avoid doing wrong, there 
must be some (objectively regarded) evil that one is avoiding, . . . some substantial evil [such as] 
[l]oss of one’s bodily integrity by being shot in the knees . . . .”); Peter Arenella, Character, Choice, 
and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, in CRIME, 
CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 59, 65 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990) (“[M]ost [choice theory] 
accounts . . . adopt a narrow time-frame that focuses on . . . the circumstances immediately 
preceding the criminal act . . . .”). 
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attitudinal theory,59 according to which actors are responsible if it can 
fairly be said that their acts reflect a reprehensible attitude toward some 
socially approved interest,60 and excused only if, in light of the 
circumstances or the actor’s disabilities, it is not appropriate to infer a 
reprehensible attitude from the act.61  Attitudinal theorists commonly 
take the compatibilist view that it does not matter that the actor’s 
attitudes did not originate with him.  And things play out much the same 
in character theory, which says an actor is judged morally responsible for 
his bad act if the act can be traced to bad character in him.62  Whether 
they take the “Humean” approach63 or the “Aristotelian” approach,64 
character theorists commonly hold the compatibilist view that an actor 
can be blamed for bad character even if his character was brought about 
by forces beyond his control.65 
                                                     
 59. Theorists who might be called attitudinal theorists include Peter Westen, Dan Kahan, and 
Martha Nussbaum.  See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 55; Westen, supra note 55. 
 60. Arenella, supra note 54, at 1576–80; Westen, supra note 55, at 71. 
 61. Westen, supra note 55, at 71–81. 
 62. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 572 (citing ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 
838 (1981)) (describing character theory as the view that “we are excused . . . when [our] actions do 
not manifest, express, reveal, or indicate bad character . . . or when such actions are not evidentiary 
of bad character”); Westen, supra note 55, at 39–42 (describing character theory as the view that a 
person is blameworthy “only if, his conduct manifests bad character . . . that is . . . only if . . . his 
conduct reveals him to possess a settled disposition to disregard the legitimate interests of others”).  
Character theory is sometimes associated with Hume, and sometimes associated with Aristotle.  
Moore also characterizes contemporary “mesh” theory compatibilists like Frankfurt and Watson as 
character theorists.  MOORE, supra note 1, at 573 n.57.  In criminal theory, character theorists 
include George Fletcher, Peter Arenella, George Vuoso, and John Gardner.  See FLETCHER, supra 
note 54, at 800; Arenella, supra note 58, at 59–83; Arenella, supra note 54, at 1524–25; John 
Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 576 (1998) (“This example shows that, 
sometimes, standards of character figure in the criminal law because they are built into the 
definitions of particular criminal offenses . . . .”); Vuoso, supra note 54, at 1685 (arguing that a 
person is morally responsible for the acts that reflect badly on her character). 
The line between attitude and character is not always clear.  A common way to distinguish them 
is to say that a “character trait” is “a well-established and relatively fixed set of values, attitudes, and 
desires,” while an attitude need only be expressed on a single occasion.  Arenella, supra note 54, at 
1577. 
 63. According to the Humean approach, certain sorts of disabilities and certain difficult 
circumstances can disrupt the link between the actor’s acts and his character, such that the actor’s 
bad acts do not reflect his true character and are therefore not blameworthy.  See Duff, supra note 
56, at 152–53 (recounting “Humean character-based” theory and distinguishing from Aristotelian 
character theory); Gardner, supra note 62, at 576 (analyzing excuses under the “Humean” view). 
 64. The Aristotelian approach rejects the Humean idea that hard circumstances can disrupt the 
link between conduct and character, but excuses seemingly bad acts when circumstances are so 
difficult that “caving in” is consistent with normatively acceptable character.  See Gardner, supra 
note 62, at 586–87 (articulating Aristotelian character theory).  Duff includes Kahan and Nussbaum 
in this group.  Duff, supra note 56, at 154 n.10 (citing Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 55). 
 65. See John Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 157, 171 (2003) 
and Vuoso, supra note 54, at 1685, for character theorists taking the position that an actor need not 
originate his character to be responsible. 
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Thus, while they disagree on many important points, compatibilist 
criminal theorists in all three groups share the view that compatibilism 
does a better job of explaining the criminal law than originationism does.  
The excuses, for example, can be explained as expressions of 
compatibilist criteria: they excuse actors not because their acts were not 
original, but because their acts were not really chosen, or did not reflect a 
bad attitude, or did not spring from undesirable character; not because 
the actor was caused to do what he did by forces beyond his control, but 
because the actor lacked the capacity for practical reason, or suffered 
some hard circumstance.  Indeed, say the compatibilist criminal theorists, 
many of the criminal law’s various excuses cannot be explained in 
originationist terms; they can only be explained by compatibilist choice, 
attitude, or character theories. 
Among criminal theorists who believe we have a retributive criminal 
law, this is the dominant view.  Most criminal theorists say that if we 
have a retributive criminal law, it is also a compatibilist one. 
C. Critical Perspectives on the Compatibilist Account of the Criminal 
Law 
Although compatibilism is the majority view among philosophers 
and criminal theorists, the compatibilist account of the criminal law is 
vulnerable to a variety of criticisms.  For example, contemporary 
compatibilists have not yet articulated a set of criteria for 
blameworthiness that can fully explain certain criminal law doctrines, 
such as the automatism doctrine,66 or some persisting debates in the 
criminal law, such as the debates about the significance of addiction for 
responsibility67 and the handling of sex offenders.68  Other critiques of 
compatibilism highlight some of its allegedly unappealing features.  It is 
said to be unfair, because it makes blame turn on moral luck, like a 
lottery, and it can be seen as parasitic on pathologies in human thought, 
such as our well-documented tendency to overestimate the role of human 
actors and underestimate the contribution of circumstances when 
explaining human acts.69 
                                                     
 66. Corrado, supra note 3, at 1201–09. 
 67. See Corrado, supra note 11, at 914 (exploring whether the compatibilist approach can 
“capture the notion of a choice that is resistible but very, very hard to resist”). 
 68. See generally Corrado, supra note 19 (exploring the philosophical bases of sexual predator 
laws). 
 69. Kaye, supra note 3, at 1157–76. 
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These are potentially fruitful critiques, but this Article takes a 
different tack.  In the Parts that follow, I inquire into the politics of the 
compatibilist criminal law, exploring what having such a law would 
mean for allocations of power and resources in society.  I conclude that 
while the compatibilist account of criminal responsibility rarely makes a 
show of its politics, it is in fact distinctly solicitous to the existing social 
and political order. 
III. COMPATIBILISM’S DISREGARD FOR HARD SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
The remainder of this Article provides an account of the politics of 
the compatibilist criminal law.  Here, I lay the foundation for the political 
account by highlighting an important distinction between compatibilism 
and originationism: at least as it appears in contemporary criminal 
theory, compatibilism is less attentive to the relationship between hard 
social conditions and criminal responsibility. 
In saying that criminal theory’s compatibilism is less attentive to 
hard social conditions, I mean that it is less likely to consider hard social 
conditions like poverty, inequality, and discrimination relevant to 
criminal responsibility.  When a compatibilist is attempting to determine 
whether an actor is responsible for his act, the compatibilist is less likely 
to explore the role that hard social conditions played in the act; if a 
person claims that present or past exposure to a particular social 
condition diminishes his responsibility for an act, the compatibilist is less 
likely to credit this claim.  In short, the compatibilist is more likely than 
the originationist to sever or abstract the individual actor from his social 
context70 and to say that hard social conditions are beside the point. 
                                                     
 70. As Alan Norrie has demonstrated, the same decontextualizing tendency is present in many 
of the criminal law’s most fundamental doctrines.  See ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND 
HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 23–24 (1993) (criminal law’s individualist 
tendencies obscure the role of social context in crime); id. at 36–46 (criminal law’s focus on 
intention rather than motive obscures social context); id. at 110–17 (voluntary act doctrine is 
structured to obscure role of social context in crime); id. at 187–94 (criminal law’s conception of 
insanity obscures the role of social conditions in madness and thus madness-related crime); see also 
id. at 171 (“[The law] is only interested in this individual performing these acts at this time.  
Everything else, which gives what the individual did meaning, and without which he would not have 
acted, is irrelevant.”); id. at 172 (“The law focuses its attention on an isolated homunculus, an 
individual without past or future, a solitary atom.”).  Norrie associates the criminal law’s 
decontextualizing tendencies with its Enlightenment-style political and psychological individualism.  
Id. at 15–31.  The criminal law’s compatibilism may be rooted in similar soil. 
Behavioral economists and critical realists have also noted the decontextualizing tendency in the 
criminal law (and in the law generally).  Jon Hanson and David Yosifon, for example, draw on 
behavioral psychology to suggest that human cognition is calibrated to see human actors as largely 
independent of their contexts: well-known heuristics, systematic biases, and ingrained knowledge 
structures consistently channel our attention away from the circumstances surrounding human acts, 
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Part III.A shows that criminal theory’s compatibilism is inattentive 
to hard social conditions, and explains why this is likely a stubborn 
feature not only of contemporary compatibilism, but of compatibilism 
generally.  Part III.B briefly contrasts compatibilism’s attitude toward 
hard social conditions with the more flexible and receptive originationist 
attitude.  In Part IV, I will show how the difference between these two 
approaches makes the compatibilist criminal law more conducive to both 
ideological and coercive defense of the social order. 
A. How Compatibilist Responsibility Inquiries Marginalize Hard Social 
Conditions 
In order to determine whether a person is responsible, the 
compatibilist (of whatever stripe) must inquire into certain facts—
namely, facts about the actor’s features and circumstances at the time of 
the act.  Of course, contemporary compatibilism is so diverse that these 
compatibilist responsibility inquiries come in several different forms, 
focusing on different aspects of the actor and his situation; but, despite 
their diversity, compatibilist responsibility inquiries have one noteworthy 
feature in common—they all push hard social conditions to the margins 
of the responsibility determination.71 
This Subpart shows why this is so.  It identifies three sorts of 
inquiries that contemporary versions of compatibilism make in 
determining responsibility—which I will call feature/capacity inquiries, 
ownership inquiries, and evidentiary inquiries—and shows that these 
inquiries are largely inattentive to facts about hard social conditions.72  
                                                                                                                       
and focus us on the human actor alone.  Legal doctrine and theory, in turn, replicate flawed human 
cognition.  Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective 
on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 133–38 (2004).  As my argument below will suggest, I think 
it plausible that these cognitive biases themselves can be traced to political culture; a more 
conventional claim might be that individualist political culture flourishes because it exploits or 
capitalizes on these cognitive biases. 
 71. One could say they “truncate[] the inquiry into moral responsibility” by drawing the line at 
social conditions.  R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of Criminal Responsibility and the 
Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 459, 463 (1994); see also id. at 475–76 
(suggesting social conditions are excluded artificially). 
 72. For example, adopting the compatibilist perspective can make us insensitive to what some 
authors call “constitutive moral luck”—bad luck with respect to the genetic, environmental, and 
experiential factors that make us who we are.  See, e.g., Nir Eisikovits, Moral Luck and the Criminal 
Law, in LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 105, 117 (Joseph Keim Campbell et al. eds., 2005) (“The 
question of whether constitutive, circumstance, or causal luck have any important bearings on the 
criminal law is almost completely overlooked . . . .  Perhaps [this] is due to the fact that both sides 
share a compatibilist assumption . . . .  According to such a view, the first three categories do not 
raise serious moral problems . . . .  It is possible that we would not have killed if we were more 
tolerant by nature, or if we had grown up in a different neighborhood . . . nevertheless . . . we are still 
 
KAYE FINAL.DOC 2/23/2007  1:05:46 PM 
382 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
This is so, I argue, because contemporary compatibilism is not disposed 
to attend to forces that influence conduct the way social conditions do—
primarily by shaping actors’ wants and dispositions in incremental and 
holistic ways.  Moreover, I will argue, it cannot do so without 
jeopardizing one of the central projects of compatibilism. 
1. Feature/Opportunity Snapshots and Social Conditions 
Most versions of contemporary compatibilism, including most of the 
versions of compatibilism articulated, followed, or cited by criminal 
theorists, place heavy emphasis on whether the actor had certain features 
and certain opportunities at the time of his act.  Ascertaining whether an 
actor has these features and opportunities requires an inquiry into a 
narrow set of facts—facts that can be captured by a “time-slice” 
“snapshot” of the actor at the time of the act itself.73  Such snapshot 
feature/opportunity inquiries of course tell us some important things 
about the actor, but they provide little opportunity to incorporate hard 
social conditions into the responsibility determination. 
Contemporary compatibilists typically hold that actors must have 
various sorts of features to be morally responsible.  For example, actors 
must have certain capacities in order to be responsible.  The choice 
theorist will say that the actor must have the sorts of intellectual 
capacities necessary for meaningful acts of choice, including the ability 
to engage in practical reasoning.  Attitudinal and character theorists often 
require similar capacities, on the ground that the inference from an 
actor’s bad act to a blameworthy attitude or character trait is not justified 
unless the actor has capacities such as the capacity for rational thought.74  
Other capacities are sometimes required as well: Arenella requires the 
actor be capable of empathy and moral self-revision,75 Wallace holds that 
                                                                                                                       
accountable.”). 
 73. FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 185.  Some such “internalist” or “time-slice” 
theories, hold that a person’s responsibility depends entirely on the state of the actor’s “mental 
economy” at the time of the act, id., though, such theories might also approve “evidentiary” inquiries 
of the sort described infra Part III.A.3.  But even theories that look beyond the snapshot of the 
actor’s mental economy place heavy weight on the snapshot itself.  The sense that this is a “narrow” 
or “limited” sort of inquiry is expressed throughout the literature.  See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 1, at 
577 (noting that choice theory is less interested in the “stories” behind acts than “character theory,” 
and that choice theory “requires a more limited enquiry into [an actor’s] capacities and opportunities 
at the moment of acting”). 
 74. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 548 (under choice theory, a person is excused from an action 
because of a lack of sufficient capacity); Vuoso, supra note 54, at 1683 (an act may not reflect a 
person’s character if they are not a rational agent). 
 75. Arenella, supra note 58, at 59. 
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the actor must be capable of “reflective self-control,”76 and Wolf says 
she must be capable of recognizing “the True and the Good.”77  
Sometimes, the feature at issue is not a capacity, but a mechanism—
Fischer and Ravizza hold that the actor is only responsible if his act is the 
product of a “reasons-responsive mechanism” in the actor.78  And 
sometimes the required feature is a mesh—the actor’s desires, wants, 
wills, or attitudes must “mesh” in a certain way if we are to hold him 
responsible.79  On each sort of theory, responsibility turns in part on 
whether the actor had the requisite feature—capacity, mechanism, or 
mesh—at the time of the act. 
Often, the feature requirement is paired with an opportunity 
requirement: in order to be responsible, the actor must have not only the 
right features, but also an adequate opportunity to act appropriately.  
After all, the capacity for practical reasoning does not mean much when 
there is a gun to the actor’s head.  It is “not fair” to hold such an actor 
responsible for his choices;80 or his act does not genuinely reflect his 
character;81 or the character revealed by the act is not an unacceptable 
one, given the circumstances;82 or the act does not reflect an undesirable 
sentiment or attitude.83  As a result, an actor is not blameworthy if, at the 
time of the act, he was subject to coercion or a “hard choice.”84  He must 
have had an adequate opportunity to act appropriately. 
These feature/opportunity inquiries capture a wealth of morally 
significant data about the actor and his circumstances, but they provide 
little opportunity to incorporate hard social conditions into the 
responsibility determination.  The feature prong of the 
feature/opportunity inquiry, for example, focuses entirely on the state of 
a person’s mental economy or the extent of his cognitive capacities at the 
time of his act.  If the requisite psychic feature—capacity, mechanism, or 
mesh—is present, the actor is responsible, and this prong of the inquiry 
ends.  If the requisite feature is not present, the actor is not responsible, 
and—again—this prong of the inquiry ends.  Either way, social 
conditions are beside the point.  Once it is known whether the actor has 
                                                     
 76. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 157. 
 77. WOLF, supra note 16, at 117. 
 78. FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 46. 
 79. Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, in FREE WILL, supra 
note 9, 167, 176; Gary Watson, Introduction to FREE WILL, supra note 9, at 1, 8. 
 80. Morse, supra note 26, at 341. 
 81. FLETCHER, supra note 54, at 496–97. 
 82. Gardner, supra note 62, at 575. 
 83. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 125; Westen, supra note 55, at 67–68. 
 84. Morse, supra note 26, at 342. 
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the requisite feature, the presence or absence of a particular social 
condition at the time of the act will not change the result of the feature 
inquiry.85  Thus, while social conditions can have a formative influence 
on mental economy and cognitive capacity, it is the resultant psychic 
features, not the formative social conditions, that matter in the feature 
prong of the feature/opportunity inquiry.86 
It is nearly the same with the opportunity prong of the 
feature/opportunity inquiry: generally speaking, social conditions make 
no difference to this inquiry.  Calibrated to capture our intuitions about a 
rare and distinctive sort of case—the gun-to-the-head case (and its 
siblings), where a person engages in highly anomalous (for them) 
conduct in reaction to immediate, intense, and transitory pressure—the 
opportunity inquiry is not interested in the sort of longitudinally 
measured “opportunities” we refer to when we talk of opportunities for 
education, employment, or personal development.87  Instead, it focuses 
entirely on the circumstances present at about the time of the act.88  What 
was physically possible for the actor at that time?  Was the actor facing 
an imminent and intense threat at the time of the act?  Was the threat 
“unfair,” in that the actor could only avoid harm to a socially recognized 
interest by harming another socially recognized interest?  So long as the 
actor was not physically constrained (e.g., by chains or walls) and was 
not subject to an imminent, intense, and unfair threat at the time of the 
act, he had the requisite fair opportunity to act appropriately.89 
Even very hard social conditions generally do not operate as actual 
physical constraints, like chains and walls.  Moreover, they almost never 
present the sort of immediate, intense, transitory, and unfair, “gun-to-the-
head” threat that deprives a person of a fair opportunity.90  It is true that 
                                                     
 85. Sometimes the presence of a particular social condition is the best evidence we have 
regarding the presence or absence of a particular psychic feature.  Desert inquiries that proceed in 
this fashion I call “evidentiary inquiries.”  Such inquiries are discussed below. 
 86. This is what criminal theorists mean when they say “one’s past is irrelevant to the 
assessment of his moral responsibility for a wrong.”  Vuoso, supra note 54, at 1680.  “The sort of 
character a person has is relevant to assessing his moral responsibility, but not how he came to have 
that character.”  Id. at 1681; see also FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 185–87 (characterizing 
Vuoso as a “snapshot,” “ahistorical” compatibilist); MOORE, supra note 1, at 525–26 (so long as a 
person’s desires and beliefs do not make it “difficult for him to reason practically,” the fact that 
“what a person desires, believes, or intends is caused by his environment” is irrelevant to desert); 
Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1659 (1994) (“The law’s 
concern is not why glitches occur.  Rather, to evaluate responsibility the law needs to know only 
whether and to what degree glitches do occur.”). 
 87. Arenella, supra note 58, at 65. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Morse, supra note 2, at 142. 
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if social conditions are such that a person literally must choose between 
starving to death and stealing food, this might infringe “opportunity” in 
the way the compatibilists mean, rendering the actor blameless.91  But 
such outrageous social conditions are also almost unheard of in modern 
Western society; as one compatibilist criminal theorist puts it, “minimal 
welfare and medical care is available to virtually anyone in the United 
States.”92  The hard social conditions that we actually have may cause 
depression, anguish, resentment, and anger—but they almost never 
present actors with an immediate, zero-sum choice between evils.  As a 
result, the opportunity inquiry will be only superficially interested in 
hard social conditions; it will mandate inquiry into only the most 
outrageous and unlikely ones. 93 
2. Ownership Inquiries and Hard Social Conditions 
The feature/opportunity inquiry is not the only inquiry in the 
compatibilist’s arsenal.  Many compatibilist criminal theorists recognize 
that “whether an agent is morally responsible cannot be read off his 
snapshot properties,”94 and that some sort of “historical” inquiry is 
necessary.95  Of course, the historical inquiry cannot be an inquiry into 
the ultimate causes of the actor’s act—that would be originationism.  
Instead, compatibilists of this sort inquire into historical matters deemed 
important to responsibility for reasons having nothing to do with 
causation.  In particular, they focus on what is sometimes called 
“ownership”: they ask whether the actor has taken ownership of, 
adopted, endorsed, ratified, or taken responsibility for certain features of 
himself that are involved in his act.96  Such ownership inquiries can 
incorporate more information about the actor and his act than 
feature/opportunity snapshot inquiries can, but even these more flexible  
 
                                                     
 91. Id.; Vuoso, supra note 54, at 1684–85. 
 92. Morse, supra note 2, at 142. 
 93. Compatibilists may want to argue that this makes sense, perhaps on the ground that since 
most people are responsible most of the time, exposure to common social conditions should not be 
an excuse.  For the moment, however, that is beside the point.  All I seek to show in this Part is that 
social conditions are rarely incorporated into this sort of compatibilist inquiry. 
 94. See FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 187 (“[E]xhibiting the current time-slice 
features constitutive of responsibility is consistent with . . . having the sort of history that, arguably, 
rules out moral responsibility [such as a history of] physical abuse as a child.”). 
 95. See Watson, supra note 3, at 256–86 (discussing the “relevance of such historical 
considerations”). 
 96. See Arenella, supra note 58, at 65 (suggesting that actors are only responsible for acts that 
flow from character traits they could have revised). 
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inquiries still fail to incorporate information about social conditions to 
any meaningful degree. 
There are various sorts of ownership inquiries, and it sometimes 
appears that they place emphasis on ownership of different sorts of 
features.  Some compatibilists focus on ownership of the particular 
desires, attitudes, or dispositions that generate the actor’s act: they say 
that for an actor to be responsible for an act, he must have taken 
ownership of the desires, attitudes, or dispositions that gave rise to his 
act.  Of course, they cannot hold that ownership requires that the relevant 
desires, attitudes, or dispositions originate with the actor—for that would 
appear to be the originationist’s position, which the compatibilist rejects.  
To avoid the origination requirement, some theories hold that it is 
enough that a desire, attitude, or disposition fits harmoniously into the 
greater scheme of one’s desires, attitudes, or dispositions, or (to put it 
another way) that the actor “identifies” with the desire, attitude, or 
disposition.97  This ownership-as-identification approach entails only a 
time-slice feature question; all it asks is whether there was the right sort 
of harmony between the desires, attitudes, or dispositions the actor acted 
on, and the rest of his desires, attitudes, or dispositions at the time he 
acted. 
The genuinely historical approach requires more than that: it holds 
that in order to take ownership of a desire, attitude, or disposition, an 
actor must traverse a certain process.  The simplest version seems to hold 
that ownership can arise when an actor sustains a desire, attitude, or 
disposition for a certain period of time.  In this vein, one theorist says 
that if a “bump on the head” turns a kind person into a cruel one, we 
might feel inclined to excuse the actor for cruel acts committed shortly 
thereafter, but if the change “persists long enough,” this “shift[s] our 
sense of the agent,” and it becomes appropriate to blame her for resulting 
bad acts.98  There is a similar account of brainwashing, which may not be 
an excuse unless the brainwashed person “had not had adequate time 
between the conditioning and the criminal act in which to reject or 
integrate her new beliefs into her character.”99  At their most demanding, 
                                                     
 97. Frankfurt, supra note 79, at 167–76. 
 98. See HURLEY, supra note 17, at 47–48 (drawing on T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO 
EACH OTHER 279 (1998)).  Hurley holds that the crucial question is whether the actor has taken 
ownership of the character trait (however the character trait came about), but suggests that as time 
passes it becomes increasingly appropriate to conclude that ownership has been taken, unless 
actively foresworn.  Id. at 47–48. 
 99. MOORE, supra note 1, at 533–34.  Moore suggests this view while describing a version of 
character theory.  Though Moore rejects character theory, it is not clear that he rejects this account of 
brainwashing, which he generally denies excuse status. 
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such theories appear to require that the responsible person actively 
approve his beliefs/desires, or at least fail to reject them despite having 
the capacity to do so.100  In such theories, it is the process of 
incorporation, not just the resulting harmony, that makes for ownership. 
Other compatibilists focus on ownership of more complex features—
not just the actors’ attitudes, but the “mechanisms” in actors that generate 
their acts, the machinery that processes desires and attitudes and 
determines whether they will be acted upon.  According to Fischer and 
Ravizza, for example, an actor is only responsible for an act if it is the 
product of a “reasons-responsive mechanism” that the actor has 
“acquired” or taken “ownership” of.101  The reasons-responsive 
mechanism is the feature that makes the actor responsible, but it is not 
enough that the actor have this feature—the actor must also have taken 
ownership of it.  For Fischer and Ravizza, taking ownership can only be 
accomplished through a particular process: an actor takes “ownership” of 
his “mechanism” when he (1) comes to see himself as a genuine agent, 
(2) comes to see himself as an apt target for the reactive attitudes of those 
around him, and (3) arrives at these conclusions on the basis of good 
evidence.102  Thus, again, a time-slice inquiry is not enough.  A historical 
inquiry is necessary to determine whether the process that amounts to 
taking ownership has occurred. 
Both sorts of ownership inquiries are considerably more flexible than 
time-slice inquiries, for they authorize the inquirer to step out of the 
snapshot and into the past.  Still, even these more flexible inquiries have 
little capacity to meaningfully incorporate hard social conditions in the 
responsibility determination.  For example, if all that is required for a 
person to take ownership of an attitude is that the person have the 
attitude for a certain period of time without disclaiming it, the inquiry 
will be focused entirely on how long the attitude existed, and whether the 
                                                     
 100. Arenella, supra note 58, at 76. 
 101. See FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 230 (“What seems relevant is not only the fact 
that the mechanism issuing in the action is suitably reasons-responsive; what also matters is how that 
mechanism has been put in place.”).  In this light, an inquiry limited to mere reason-responsiveness 
“does not make us look sufficiently far into the past”; we must also look at the “process of taking” 
ownership.  Id. at 230–31. 
 102. Id. at 210–14.  To see oneself as a genuine agent is to believe that one’s “choices and 
actions are efficacious in the world.”  Id. at 210.  To see oneself as an apt target of others’ reactive 
attitudes is to see it as “fair,” given the social context, for others to subject one to their reactive 
attitudes, id. at 211, at least in the limited sense that one sees oneself as a participant in the moral 
community, id. at 213.  To arrive at these conclusions on the basis of good evidence is to see oneself 
as an agent on the basis of legitimate evidence that one’s acts are efficacious, and to see oneself as 
an apt target for reactive attitudes on the basis of legitimate evidence that “social practices” 
generally make people like oneself targets of reactive attitudes.  Id. at 213. 
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actor resisted it.  This is a question of what the actor did, and in what 
time frame.  Social conditions are irrelevant here: the presence or 
absence of a particular social condition will not change the fact that time 
passed or did not, nor will it change the fact that the actor resisted or 
failed to resist an attitude.  Though social conditions may have brought 
an attitude to life and dictated the actor’s treatment of the attitude, the 
attitude-ownership inquiry is not concerned with where an attitude came 
from nor why the actor treated it the way he did.  It is only concerned 
with how the actor treated the attitude once it arrived. 
The same is true of the more complex mechanism-ownership 
inquiries.  For example, while Fischer and Ravizza do devote some 
attention to the role social conditions play in conduct, and express 
sympathy for the notion that social conditions might sometimes be 
excusing, their mechanism-ownership inquiry leaves little room for 
accommodating these intuitions.  Whether an actor has a reasons-
responsive mechanism is, itself, a time-slice question, for which social 
conditions are beside the point.  Whether the actor owns his mechanism 
is a historical question, and thus opens the door to a historical inquiry; 
but this historical inquiry is structured in such a way that there is little 
room for meaningful inquiry into hard social conditions. 
Notice, for example, that hard social conditions are totally irrelevant 
to the first two facets of the mechanism-ownership inquiry.  An actor 
either does or does not come to see himself as a genuine agent and an apt 
target for reactive attitudes—this is entirely a matter of what happens in 
his psychic economy.  One might imagine that social conditions could 
have a bearing on the third process factor, whether the actor comes to see 
himself as a genuine agent and apt target for reactive attitudes on the 
basis of good evidence.  For example, it is conceivable that an actor 
could be “tricked” into seeing himself in these ways by his political 
culture’s misleading accounts of agency or reactive attitude.  In such a 
case, he would reach the developmental landmarks necessary for 
responsibility, but do so on the basis of “bad evidence” (namely, 
misleading cultural accounts of agency and reactive attitude).  But 
opening the door to this possibility does not mean opening the door to a 
significant inquiry into social conditions.  For one thing, cases like this 
surely are exceedingly rare.  It will almost never happen that social 
conditions will trick a person into seeing himself as an agent, or into 
believing he is the sort of person that social practice identifies as an apt 
target for reactive attitudes.  Nearly all people in modern Western 
society, no matter what their social environment, will reach these 
conclusions on the basis of mundane, elemental observations about the 
efficaciousness of their acts and the reactive practices of their society.  
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More to the point, even if this inquiry can be said to pay heed to social 
conditions, the conditions it pays heed to are far from the heartland of 
conditions that seem most likely to be bound up with human acts.  There 
is no room, here, to consider the way social conditions influence the 
actor’s attitudes, no room to account for the ways social conditions 
influence conduct through their influence on our desires, attitudes, and 
dispositions.  Thus, though Fischer and Ravizza note the possible 
significance of social conditions like deprivation and inequality, their 
mechanism-ownership inquiry makes little room for a meaningful 
inquiry into the relationship between these conditions and human acts. 
Indeed, upon reflection, it should not be surprising to discover that 
ownership inquiries are largely incapable of accommodating inquiry into 
social conditions, for social conditions are largely irrelevant to the sort of 
ownership at issue here.  Generally speaking, social conditions do not 
make us act on attitudes or mechanisms we do not “own,” as though 
social conditions were a computer hacker installing a malicious and 
anomalous code; rather, social conditions instill such attitudes and 
mechanisms as part of the larger, incremental and holistic process of 
shaping our unified identities.  The ownership criteria has been 
developed with the hacker-type case in mind.  In fact, it has been 
designed to capture our moral intuitions about a highly stylized sort of 
hypothetical popular in the philosophical literature—one in which an 
omnipotent and nefarious actor (a demon, a superneurosurgeon, or a 
diabolical hypnotist) implants a desire in an actor, and the desire causes 
the actor to commit a particular act.103  Most of us share the intuition that 
such actors are not responsible, but feature/opportunity analysis has 
trouble explaining why.  The ownership requirement provides an easy 
answer: the actor is not responsible because he does not own the desire 
implanted by the nefarious demon, doctor, or hypnotist.  In the real 
world, of course, our desires almost never arise this way.  We are rarely 
“hacked.”  More to the point, it is especially unlikely that social 
conditions “hack” us.  Thus, the ownership inquiry will almost never turn 
to social conditions—it has its eyes out for demons, superneurosurgeons, 
and hypnotist hackers, not poverty and inequality. 
                                                     
 103. See, e.g., id. at 236 (explaining the mechanism-ownership criteria as a response to hacker-
style cases). 
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3. Evidentiary Inquiries and Social Conditions 
There is another way the contemporary compatibilist can arrive at a 
more expansive responsibility inquiry: facts that are considered formally 
irrelevant to responsibility might still be deemed useful on evidentiary 
grounds, insofar as they can cast light on whether a formally relevant fact 
is true.104  The inquiry into such evidentiary facts is likely to sweep more 
broadly than the feature/opportunity and ownership inquiries.  For our 
purposes, however, compatibilist evidentiary inquiries play out the same 
way that feature/opportunity and ownership inquiries do: they pay little 
heed to hard social conditions. 
The premise of the evidentiary inquiry is that even facts that are not 
formally determinative of responsibility can sometimes be the best 
available evidence regarding facts that are determinative of 
responsibility.  This is so because we are not very good at determining 
whether feature or ownership criteria are satisfied in particular cases.  
We cannot always directly perceive whether a person has features like 
the capacity for rational thought or the capacity to recognize “the True 
and the Good”; nor are we likely to have direct evidence about whether 
the actor owns his attitudes or his reasons-responsive mechanisms.  In 
some cases, however, we can at least partly overcome these epistemic 
problems by asking whether a person with this actor’s past is likely to 
have the requisite features, or to satisfy the ownership requirement.105  
For example, we might think that a person with a particular history is 
especially likely to lack the capacity for rational thought, or especially 
likely to lack the capacity to recognize “the True and the Good.”106  And 
                                                     
 104. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 3, at 263–65 (discussing possibility that information about 
deprived childhood is mitigating because it is indirect evidence that the actor suffers from a present 
disability).  There are hints of this evidential use of historical facts about acts throughout the 
literature of compatibilism.  See, e.g., Morse, supra note 86, at 1659 (“Understanding the causal 
background may in some cases be probative about whether an excusing condition exists,” even when 
“no particular cause is required to justify the excusing condition.”); Vuoso, supra note 54, at 1681 
(“His past might be relevant in helping us to understand the nature of the defects in his character.”). 
 105. See, e.g., FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 188–90, 195 (describing “epistemic” 
inquiries); WALLACE, supra note 13, at 165 (noting that it is “not . . . always entirely clear which 
people actually have the powers of reflective self-control” and observing a correlation between the 
presence of this feature and “certain sorts of moral education . . . and emotional support . . . and 
freedom from hypocrisy and arbitrariness in the promulgation and enforcement of moral  
standards”); id. at 233 n.8 (“[A]ppeals to childhood deprivation affect our judgments of 
responsibility by altering our perception of the motives and abilities of the wrongdoer as an adult . . . 
.”); WOLF, supra note 16, at 85–86 (discussing blameworthiness and the “Reason View”). 
 106. See WOLF, supra note 16, at 86 (conceding that it is difficult to know whether a person has 
the capacity to recognize and conform to the True and the Good, and explaining that it helps to 
consider whether “persons with a similar history” have or lack the relevant traits). 
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the same approach can be applied to address questions of ownership.  
Again, we might think that a person with a particular history might be 
especially likely to own (or fail to own) his attitudes or his reasons-
responsive mechanism. 
This sort of inquiry lends itself to a much more creative and 
inquisitive review of the history of an act than the time-slice and 
ownership inquiries described so far.  So long as we think that a 
particular event or circumstance might be correlated with whether an 
actor has the features or ownership necessary for responsibility, we are 
authorized—or obligated—to scan the actor’s history for that event or 
occurrence.  Indeed, many compatibilists explicitly or implicitly attempt 
to use this approach to make their compatibilisms sensitive to social 
conditions. 
Susan Wolf does this in a thoughtful way.  Wolf’s criteria for blame 
looks to whether the actor is able to “do the right thing for the right 
reasons.”107  The test is whether the actor has “the ability to know . . . the 
True and the Good,” and the “ability to convert [that] knowledge into 
action.”108  Of course, Wolf says, it can be difficult to ascertain whether 
an actor has these features directly, so it is sometimes useful to scan the 
actor’s history for influences likely to foster or impair the development 
of these abilities.109  According to Wolf, this evidentiary inquiry will be 
attentive to social conditions, for some social conditions—like childhood 
deprivation and pathological moral education—have predictable impacts 
on whether actors develop the abilities necessary for responsibility.110 
The problem is that this evidentiary inquiry makes less room for 
attention to hard social conditions than Wolf appears to think.  For one 
thing, the door to this evidentiary inquiry does not even open unless there 
is doubt about ownership or the actor’s features, in the first place.  For 
example, if having the capacity to recognize and act upon “the True and 
the Good” makes an actor responsible (as Wolf says it does), and if it is 
reasonably clear that the actor does have such a capacity, it will not be 
appropriate to embark on any more free-wheeling evidentiary 
exploration.  Thus, in many cases there will be no call for this sort of 
historical inquiry and it will take us nowhere toward contemplation of 
social conditions. 
                                                     
 107. Id. at 87. 
 108. Id. at 87–88; see also id. at 143 (clarifying that the capacity to know the True and the Good 
entails the ability to “appreciat[e] that it was wrong, and that something else would have been 
better”). 
 109. Id. at 86. 
 110. Id. 
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Moreover, even when this sort of inquiry is appropriate, it will only 
crack the door to consideration of social conditions.  Even at its broadest, 
the inquiry can only look to facts that bear on the presence of the 
requisite features and ownership, but most social conditions, even the 
ones we commonly associate with antisocial conduct, simply have no 
bearing on either the presence or absence of such features or ownership.  
Consider Wolf’s example again: Wolf suggests that when social 
conditions dictate a person’s values, this can dissolve moral 
responsibility.111  It is not clear, however, that on her standard for moral 
responsibility this is a meaningful possibility.  She suggests that certain 
social conditions are likely to prevent or substantially impair the 
development of the capacities required for moral responsibility—the 
capacities to recognize and act in conformity with “the True and the 
Good.”112  But, upon reflection, it seems implausible that the most 
common of the social conditions she discusses could have this effect.  
For example, she suggests that childhood deprivation could have this 
effect; but it seems implausible that any realistically imaginable state of 
childhood deprivation would actually prevent an actor from developing 
the ability to recognize “the True and the Good”113 or that it would really 
eviscerate the ability to act in accord with “the True and the Good.”  At 
least in contemporary Western society, our conceptions of “the True and 
the Good” are transmitted so persistently and pervasively, and through 
such a diversity of media, that it does not seem possible that an 
intellectually intact person could reach adulthood without being able to 
recognize “the True and the Good.”114  And while childhood deprivation 
                                                     
 111. In fact, Wolf sometimes wavers on this claim, characterizing it as “controversial.”  Id. at 37. 
 112. See id. (describing the persons as having “values we are apt to explain as resulting from 
deprived or otherwise traumatic childhoods”). 
 113. The ability to “recognize” moral values can be defined in less and more demanding ways.  
But even on a more demanding definition—e.g., recognition requires not just intellectual 
understanding, but affective appreciation—the point holds true.  This point is further developed in 
the discussion of R. Jay Wallace’s approach to evidentiary inquiry.  See infra notes 117–25 and 
accompanying text (discussing Wallace’s approach). 
 114. Wolf sketches the possibility that this can happen, suggesting that social conditions 
sometimes deprive people of information about “the True and the Good.”  As she puts it, “[a] victim 
of a deprived (or depraved) childhood” may be “exposed to an unfortuitous collection of data” such 
that she cannot reason out “the True and the Good.”  WOLF, supra note 16, at 75–76.  Given the 
pervasive dissemination of cultural norms in modern Western society, this seems very unlikely. 
[P]eople raised in a culture of deprivation in the United States typically . . . know a great 
deal about the dominant culture and laws through schooling, the media, and other means 
of transmitting such knowledge . . . .  [M]ost parents in subcultures of deprivation teach 
their children the “dominant” morality . . . .  As an empirical matter, virtually all deprived 
people know the “dominant” moral and legal rules and possess the general capacity to 
understand their moral and practical bases. 
Morse, supra note 2, at 147. 
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might well make an actor prefer not to act in accord with “the True and 
the Good,” it surely does not actually negate the ability to do so in 
anything but the most outlandish cases115—indeed, even the very worst 
actors, exposed to the very worst sorts of social conditions, generally act 
in accord with “the True and the Good” most of the time.  Thus, only the 
most unusual social conditions—conditions that do catastrophic damage 
to basic human abilities—will be of any interest to Wolf’s evidentiary 
inquiry. 
Similar things can be said about the other compatibilists who endorse 
such evidentiary inquiries.  Consider, for example, the approach 
recommended by R. Jay Wallace, the contemporary philosopher most 
often relied upon by compatibilist criminal theorists.  Wallace also offers 
one of the most ambitious attempts to make room for social conditions in 
the compatibilist desert inquiry, and one of the most illuminating 
failures.116 
According to Wallace, a person is responsible for a breach of a moral 
obligation if the person is capable of “reflective self-control,” meaning 
he is capable of understanding moral reasons and capable of controlling 
his acts in accord with those reasons.117  Wallace maintains that certain 
social conditions can influence whether a person develops the capacity 
for reflective self-control.118  As he explains, some formative conditions, 
including some social conditions, are 
exceptionally unfavorable to the development of a normal level of the 
powers of reflective self-control.  People exposed to these conditions 
will often find it extremely difficult to take moral requirements 
seriously . . . .  They may be subject to a kind of pent-up, displaced 
anger . . . and this may be a source of unusually strong incentives to 
antisocial behavior.  Or their self-esteem may be so low that . . . they 
                                                                                                                       
Some criminal theorists offer some support for Wolf’s view.  See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 11, 
at 30–32 (arguing that underground economies with their own sets of norms arise in some 
circumstances, and that young people raised in such economies may not be exposed to mainstream 
norms); Wright, supra note 71, at 473 (“Oppressed groups may, for example, lack without 
culpability relevant knowledge of what the law requires.  Their lack of knowledge may be the result 
of governmental and societal failure . . . .”).  But even these theorists recognize that such cases 
“should not arise often,” noting that “[m]ass communications and compulsory schooling are 
counteracting influences.”  Delgado, supra note 11, at 88 n.505. 
 115. Perhaps one can imagine extraordinary cases in which it does so, as by making an actor 
susceptible to irresistible impulses (e.g., impulses arising from literally overwhelming rage).  But 
such conditions are either nonexistent or exceedingly rare, and Wolf does not suggest that this is the 
sort of social condition she is attempting to accommodate with her theory. 
 116. Peter Arenella’s “thick” character theory has some of the same virtues and flaws.  See 
generally Arenella, supra note 54, for Arenella’s character theory. 
 117. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 7. 
 118. Id. at 232–33. 
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can . . . be driven to engage in behavior that confirms their sense of 
failure and worthlessness.119 
This is a nuanced account of how certain formative conditions might lead 
to conduct, one that recognizes that the most basic way that such 
conditions influence conduct is that they generate and influence the 
desires, attitudes, and dispositions that drive conduct.  Moreover, this 
account makes a compelling claim about how this process bears directly 
on moral responsibility.  Sometimes, social conditions generate desires, 
attitudes, and dispositions that are antagonistic to the capacity for 
reflective self-control, either because they impair the ability to 
understand moral reasons (particularly by undermining affective 
understanding rather than intellectual understanding) or because they 
undercut the ability to conform acts to moral reasons. 
So far, it might seem that Wallace’s responsibility inquiry will 
naturally entail a significant evidentiary inquiry into the social conditions 
behind an actor’s act, but this impression is misleading.  For, as with 
Wolf, it is actually quite implausible that any but the most extraordinary 
social conditions could have the sort of impact that Wallace describes.  
After all, it cannot be that conditions that merely make someone dislike 
moral requirements are enough to defeat responsibility.  Nor can it be 
that conditions that merely instill anger or self-doubt are good enough, 
for such attitudes and feelings generally do not genuinely corrupt the 
capacity for reflective self-control.  Indeed, Wallace himself makes this 
perfectly clear.  The conditions that defeat responsibility, he says, are 
ones so “chronic and extreme”120 that they render a person essentially a 
“psychopath.”121  Such conditions are, realistically, hard to conceive.  As 
Wallace points out, conditions of “desperate poverty and violence” do 
not rise to this level.  Being raised in such conditions may make it more 
difficult for a person to exercise reflective self-control, but it does not 
“deprive[] [him] altogether of [this] power[].”122  That people experience 
such conditions, then, does not mean we must exempt them from blame, 
and it is still appropriate “to punish them for their crimes.”123  Thus, 
                                                     
 119. Id.; see also id. at 214 (discussing how deprivations suffered as a child may affect the moral 
accountability of that person as an adult). 
 120. Id. at 232. 
 121. Id. at 233.  On the well-known debate whether psychopathy itself should be excusing, see 
Arenella, supra note 54, at 1608–21, highlighting law’s reluctance to treat psychopathy as excusing 
and offering a character-based argument that it should. 
 122. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 233; see also Arenella, supra note 54, at 1615 (emphasizing 
rarity of cases of true psychopathy). 
 123. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 233. 
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despite Wallace’s apparent sensitivity to hard social conditions, his 
theory attends only to the most extraordinary ones.  He recognizes that 
“pockets of desperate poverty and violence” are “increasingly common 
in modern industrialized societies,”124 but does not make meaningful 
room for them in his calculation of criminal responsibility.  Again, the 
social conditions most likely to be implicated in bread-and-butter cases 
of bad conduct are pushed to the margin.125 
In short, even the seemingly free-wheeling evidentiary inquiry is not 
well-suited to incorporate social conditions into the compatibilist’s 
responsibility inquiry.126  For one thing, the evidentiary inquiry is not 
available unless there is doubt about a feature or ownership—and it will 
often be true that there is no reasonable basis for doubt on either front.  
For another, the evidentiary inquiry is tethered to features in the actor 
that themselves are unlikely to be significantly influenced by modern 
Western society’s bread-and-butter hard social conditions, thus making it 
unlikely that we will actually stray into contemplation of social 
conditions while we pursue this kind of evidentiary inquiry in 
contemporary cases.127 
                                                     
 124. Id. 
 125. Wallace does emphasize that we should be willing to adjust our “moral responses” to cases 
in which conditions like poverty and violence exist.  Id.  Responsibility comes in degrees, he says, 
and such conditions may reduce the degree of an actor’s responsibility.  Id. at 234.  Nevertheless, he 
does not anticipate that adjusting our moral responses in this way will affect our judgments of 
criminal desert—only conditions of the sort that bring about near-psychopathy can do that.  Id. at 
233.  Thus, engaging in Wallace’s desert inquiry in the criminal justice context will generally not 
lead to direct contemplation of social conditions. 
 126. Here I have used the accounts given by Wolf and Wallace as illustrative examples.  The 
result would likely be the same with the other compatibilists who recognize the value of evidentiary 
inquiry.  Consider Fischer and Ravizza, who hold actors responsible for acts produced by reasons-
responsive mechanisms they own.  Fischer and Ravizza recognize that historical inquiry might 
sometimes cast light on whether an actor meets these requirements; but social conditions will 
generally be beyond the bounds of such inquiry.  Only the most rare and outrageous social 
conditions (e.g., childhood deprivation intense enough to bring about psychopathy, or mass 
brainwashing in the style of 1984) could genuinely call into question whether the actor acted through 
a reasons-responsive mechanism, or whether he had taken ownership of that mechanism in the 
proper way.  In most cases, it will be easily determined that such conditions were not present, and 
the historical inquiry will ignore the less dramatic, holistic, desire-shaping effect of much more 
common social conditions (like poverty and inequality). 
 127. See Arenella, supra note 58, at 65 (noting that nearly all adult actors, no matter what 
conditions they encounter, have capacity for practical reasoning and opportunity to act 
appropriately); Wright, supra note 71, at 476, 476 n.49 (common focus on cognitive capacities 
“reduce[s] the practical significance of [the] analyses by focusing on stress as an episodic, personal, 
or transient phenomenon, as opposed to the chronic, inescapable systemic horrors faced by the most 
deprived groups”; “[i]t may well be . . . that most severely deprived criminal defendants are capable 
of practical reason, in the sense of being sane, or having any given level of measured intelligence, or 
possessing creative, resourceful, resilient or adaptive traits.  . . . [This] should not detract from the 
various ways in which a person may be deprived of the capacity for responsibility.”) 
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4. Why Compatibilism Marginalizes Hard Social Conditions 
Even though many compatibilists express the intuition that hard 
social conditions have some bearing on moral responsibility, then, 
contemporary compatibilism’s responsibility inquiries do not make much 
room for consideration of the sorts of hard social conditions that are most 
common in modern Western society.  In this Subpart, I suggest that 
contemporary compatibilism generally disregards hard social conditions 
because it cannot “see” the sort of process by which hard social 
conditions most commonly influence antisocial conduct.  In the next 
Subpart, I contend that this blindness is likely to be a stubborn feature 
not only of contemporary compatibilism, but of compatibilism generally, 
for to “see” this kind of process would jeopardize one of compatibilism’s 
core projects. 
While there is notorious controversy about how hard social 
conditions influence human behavior, there is widespread agreement on 
some very basic points.  For example, there is little dispute about the 
basic premise that hard social conditions like poverty, inequality, and 
discrimination are catalysts to antisocial conduct.128  There also appears 
to be agreement that hard social conditions can catalyze antisocial 
conduct even when they do not deprive actors of basic human 
capacities,129 foist anomalous attitudes on passive recipients, or truly 
                                                     
 128. It is common to say that conditions like poverty and inequality are criminogenic.  See, e.g., 
Delgado, supra note 11, at 23–37 (summarizing social scientific and medical literature on the 
contribution of environmental deprivation to criminal behavior); Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of 
Criminal Defense Based Upon the Toxicity of the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television 
Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731, 758–83 (1982) (surveying the social science 
literature on the psychological effects of real-life violence, television violence, and racism); see also 
DEIRDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTION, CRIME PREVENTION, AND THE 
LAW 155 (2005) (“There is broad (though not universal) agreement among criminologists that social 
factors such as income inequality, poverty, unemployment, and local social disorganization 
contribute to crime.”); id. at 155–72 (collecting and canvassing sources); NORVALL MORRIS, 
MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 63 (1982) (“Social adversity is grossly more potent in its 
pressure toward criminality . . . toward all forms of violence and street crime . . . than is any 
psychotic condition.”).  But see Morse, supra note 2, at 115 (poverty and deprivation are “strongly 
correlated with criminal behavior . . . but whether the correlation reflects a causal relation . . . is [a] . 
. . controversial question”). 
 129. See Arenella, supra note 58, at 82–83 (many actors develop basic capacities for 
instrumental reasoning, no matter what formative influences they encounter); Delgado, supra note 
11, at 41 (“A defendant entering a [“rotten-social-background”] defense is asserting that adverse 
external forces have influenced behavior, not that he or she has a weak intellect.”); Morse, supra 
note 2, at 144 (“[D]espite the undoubted stresses of their lives, few deprived people lack the general 
capacity to be guided by good reason.”); Wright, supra note 71, at 476 (“[I]t may well be . . . that 
most severely deprived criminal defendants are capable of practical reason, in the sense of being 
sane, or having any given level of measured intelligence, or possessing creative, resourceful, 
resilient or adaptive traits.”). 
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eliminate opportunities to act appropriately.130  Indeed, we generally 
recognize that hard social conditions seem to catalyze antisocial conduct 
among actors who are not fundamentally different from ourselves—
actors who have the same basic capacities we have, the same ownership-
relation to their attitudes and desires that we have to ours, and who have 
genuine opportunities to act appropriately, just as we do.  Most criminals 
are more or less complete, functional, and choosing persons, just like 
noncriminals. 
If we think hard social conditions catalyze antisocial conduct, then, it 
is not (primarily) because we think such conditions deprive people of 
essential features and opportunities to act appropriately, but because we 
think these conditions influence how people use these features and 
opportunities.  They do so by bringing to life antisocial desires, attitudes, 
and dispositions.  Hard social conditions cause people to want things 
they are not supposed to want, and to want these prohibited things more 
badly than most people do.  They cultivate antisocial feelings like anger, 
envy, anxiety, self-hatred, frustration, impotence, despair, and need.131  
They foster antisocial attitudes like callousness, self-absorption, 
irritability, excitability, impulsiveness, disdain for social norms, disdain 
for authority, and insensitivity to violence or violence against particular 
targets.132  They nurture cognitive styles conducive to antisocial 
preferences, including socially unwelcome approaches to the weighing of 
risk and reward and the valuing of present and future gratification.133  In 
these ways, hard social conditions construct in actors the matrices of 
antisocial desires, attitudes, and cognitive styles that generate bad acts.  
In short, it is not that hard social conditions make people incomplete 
                                                     
 130. Morse, supra note 86, at 1653 (although hard social conditions can be criminogenic, social 
conditions that are genuinely coercive “rarely arise”). 
 131. See Delgado, supra note 11, at 23–24 (hard social conditions instill frustration that leads to 
aggression); id. at 26–27 (unemployment and substandard living conditions produce envy and 
anxiety); id. at 64 (hard social conditions instill intense anger); id. at 81 (hard social conditions 
diminish “self-respect”); Falk, supra note 128, at 762 (violent environments lead to depression and 
anxiety); id. at 776–77 (racism leads to self-contempt, anger, frustration, and anxiety); Morse, supra 
note 2, at 142 (suggesting poverty entails “unsatisfied needs and desires” and “material want”); id. at 
144 (connecting poverty to “rage” and “stress”). 
 132. See Delgado, supra note 11, at 81 (citing theory that “vengeful, self-seeking behavior is a 
normal response to an oppressive social system,” and that [“rotten social background”] may lead one 
to “[have] no attachment to the broader community, and [be] a constant source of misdirected 
rebellion”). 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 46 ([“rotten social background”] likely generates heightened sensitivity to 
potential danger); Falk, supra note 128, at 741 (citing Greg Seigle, Union Station Killer Gets 10-
Year Minimum, WASH. TIMES, June 10, 1994, at C10) (suggesting there may be a “defensive mind-
set prevalent in tough, inner-city neighborhoods”); Morse, supra note 86, at 1653 (suggesting that 
“deprivation” and “rotten social background” may “produce[] character flaws” and “antisocial 
predispositions”). 
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persons or fragmented beings, nor that they deprive people of 
opportunities to act, nor that they inject into them alien desires and traits.  
Rather, we think that they work on people in gradual, incremental ways, 
making them complete, fully functional, coherent beings who want 
things they are not supposed to want,134 and giving them strong motives 
to act on those wants even when they have the capacity and opportunity 
not to. 
If this is the way hard social conditions most commonly influence 
conduct, it is no wonder that contemporary compatibilism cannot “see” 
it.  Contemporary compatibilism has a very particular taste when it 
comes to inquiry into desire and disposition formation.  It is interested in 
circumstances and events that influence desires and dispositions in a 
distinctive and bizarre way—by sparking to life anomalous and 
transitory desires and dispositions, as guns-to-the-head and supernatural 
neurosurgeons do.  But it has less interest in phenomena that shape 
desires and dispositions “normally,” in a gradual, holistic way.  
Momentary invasions of the desire/disposition formation process matter, 
but otherwise, “the source . . . of the actor’s goals, desires, and values 
that motivate his choice are [not] relevant . . . .”135  “The sort of character 
a person has is relevant to assessing his moral responsibility for an 
action, but not how he came to have that character.”136  In short, 
contemporary compatibilism’s interest in desire/disposition formation 
extends only to a certain sort of abnormal and transitory 
desire/disposition acquisition.  Because there is nothing abnormal or 
transitory about the way the sorts of hard social conditions found in 
modern Western society today shape desires and dispositions, 
contemporary compatibilism does not include most real-world hard 
social conditions in its responsibility determinations.  It cannot see them. 
5. Resistance to Social Conditions as a Stubborn Feature of 
Compatibilism 
Contemporary compatibilism, then, cannot “see” the process by 
which common hard social conditions do their criminogenic work.  But 
is this just a coincidence of current theory, or a more enduring feature of 
                                                     
 134. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 128, at 763 (citing James Garbino et al., What Children Can Tell 
Us About Living in Danger, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 376, 377 (1991) (collecting literature showing 
that harsh social conditions can lead to “alterations of personality, and major changes in patterns of 
behavior or articulations of ideological interpretations of the world that provide a framework for 
making sense of ongoing danger”). 
 135. Arenella, supra note 58, at 64. 
 136. Vuoso, supra note 54, at 1681. 
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compatibilism generally?  In this Subpart, I argue that there is reason to 
think that lack of interest in such social conditions is at least a stubborn 
feature of compatibilism, if not an inevitable one.  Making room for 
phenomena that influence conduct through this sort of gradual, holistic 
desire/disposition formation would jeopardize one of compatibilism’s 
central projects. 
The project I refer to is salvaging blame—by corralling excuse—in 
the era of causal explanation.137  Anxiety about the fate of blame in a 
causal world is a persistent feature of the compatibilist literature.  When 
contemplating the possibility that we must excuse actors when their acts 
are caused by forces beyond their control, compatibilists ask “if we do 
that job right, will there be anyone left to blame?”138  The possibility that 
there will not is contemplated in terms redolent with danger and dismay.  
These are “drastic implications”139 and “highly undesirable.”140  They are 
“pernicious and debilitating,”141 “disturbing,”142 “distressing,”143 
“startling,”144 “troubling,”145 “perilous,”146 and even “tragic.”147  When 
                                                     
 137. I do not mean that the only aspect of compatibilism that is “satisfying” to compatibilists is 
its ability to salvage blame from causation.  On the contrary, it appears that compatibilists have 
traditionally pursued several different sorts of projects at the same time.  One is the project I focus 
on here.  Another is the project of articulating an account of our blaming practices that is subtle 
enough to capture all their nuances.  See, e.g., WALLACE, supra note 13, at 7 (“The possibility that 
determinism might be true gives an extra immediacy to the issue of whether it is compatible with 
moral responsibility, but the reason for considering this issue—my reason, at least—is to obtain an 
improved understanding of the conditions of responsibility . . . .”).  Yet another is demonstrating that 
human life is valuable, satisfying, meaningful, and worth living even if determinism is true.  All I 
suggest here is that one of the appealing features of compatibilism—for compatibilists—has been its 
ability to keep blame from being overwhelmed by causal explanation. 
 138. DENNETT, supra note 11, at 99; see also id. at 157 (“[S]ince we are all more or less 
imperfect, will there be anyone left to be responsible after we have excused all those with good 
excuses?”); FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 28 (stating that the possibility that originationism 
and determinism are both true leaves us “not clear that we can legitimately hold each other morally 
responsible for our behavior”); MOORE, supra note 1, at 504 (stating that if determinism and 
originationism are true, “it is hard to see why everyone is not excused for all actions”); Strawson, 
supra note 9, at 72 (Is it true “that if [determinism] is true, then the concepts of moral obligation and 
responsibility really have no application, and the practices of punishing and blaming, of expressing 
moral condemnation and approval, are really unjustified?”); id. at 73 (some believe that “just 
punishment . . . impl[ies] moral guilt and guilt implies moral responsibility and moral responsibility 
implies freedom and freedom implies the falsity of determinism” (emphasis omitted)). 
 139. WOLF, supra note 16, at 12. 
 140. Id. at 26. 
 141. MOORE, supra note 1, at 490–91. 
 142. FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 17. 
 143. Id. at 28. 
 144. Id. 
 145. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 3. 
 146. Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 
960 (1992) (“Concessions to determinism are as inevitable as they are perilous . . . .”). 
 147. MOORE, supra note 1, at 244. 
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we think about them, we feel “fear,” 148 we talk “all in a rush”149 like a 
scared child, or we are made into “pessimists”150 and “cynic[s].”151  
Blame is seen as “imperiled,”152 “engulf[ed]” by excuses.153  
Responsibility is not merely called into question; it is “challenge[d]”154 
and “threaten[ed].”155  Sometimes it is suggested that there is something 
vulgar about the argument that actors should be excused for acts caused 
by forces beyond their control: it is “seductive,”156 exerting a “deep 
pull,”157 with results “bordering on the indecent.”158  And sometimes 
compatibilists in this vein seem to suggest that something more nefarious 
may be at work.  Compatibilists portray originationists as cutting away 
responsibility slice by slice, making “lifelong effort[s] to expand the 
categories of those who should be excused,”159 scheming to “free the 
maximal number of defendants.”160  In the compatibilist literature, then, 
causal explanation is dangerous; if yoked to the wrong theory of 
responsibility, it “threatens” to do away with blame entirely. 
One of compatibilism’s projects is saving us from this fate—
salvaging blame in a causal universe.161  “We are looking . . . for some 
elbow room for . . . sinners in between the saints [who never do wrong] 
                                                     
 148. See DENNETT, supra note 11, at 157 (“[O]ne thing we fear is that no one ever really 
deserves the punishment society metes out . . . .”). 
 149. Strawson, supra note 9, at 73. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Michael S. Moore, The Determinist Theory of Excuses, 95 ETHICS 909, 916 (1985). 
 152. Strawson, supra note 9, at 73. 
 153. Moore, supra note 151, at 916. 
 154. FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 17. 
 155. Id.; WALLACE, supra note 13, at 6, 234; WOLF, supra note 16, at 12. 
 156. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 58, 196; see also MOORE, supra note 1, at 491 (discussing the 
“seductive plausibility of the causal [originationist] theory of excuse”). 
 157. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 196. 
 158. Id. at 234.  In a related vein, he intones that we need “protection against the admittedly 
powerful lure of liberty,” id. at 225, and thinks of the desire for contra-causal freedom as “a kind of 
fetish.”  Id. at 3. 
 159. Moore, supra note 151, at 916. 
 160. Id.  There are other passages in Moore that give the impression of responsibility being eaten 
away, too.  See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 1, at 242–43 (moral luck thought experiments consume 
responsibility piece by piece). 
 161. Arenella and Corrado provide further discussion on this subject.  See Arenella, supra note 
54, at 1611–13 (discussing ways “the specter of determinism” has influenced moral and legal theory, 
noting “determinism’s constant threat” and the “worry it causes,” speculating that compatibilist 
criminal theorists have been attracted to choice theory because it appears to withstand “the 
onslaughts of determinism” better than some other compatibilist theories); Corrado, supra note 3, at 
1206 (“[M]ost compatibilists believe that determinism is true but do not want to give up the right to 
hold people responsible”; compatibilism is “fuel[ed]” by “the attempt to avoid [the] conclusion” that 
“no one is responsible for anything.”). 
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and the monsters [whom we must excuse],”162 says Daniel Dennett.  
Strawson announces that his goal is to make the causation-preoccupied 
“pessimist” give up his worry that blame is unjustifiable.163  
Compatibilism, say its proponents, gives us the elbow room we need; it 
helps the pessimist give up his pessimism about blame.  Moore’s 
compatibilism shows “there is . . . no good reason to fear” that there is a 
“general moral excuse.”164  Fischer and Ravizza declare they “have taken 
the first step toward protecting our moral responsibility” from the 
“challenges” posed by determinism.165  They contend that “one of the 
great virtues of our approach to moral responsibility is that, on our 
account, it is highly plausible that moral responsibility is compatible with 
. . . determinism.”166  Wallace “diagnoses” the problem like a disease, 
and provides “therapy” in order to cure it.167  His theory “deprives 
incompatibilism of its foothold in our understanding of the legitimate 
conditions of responsible moral agency.”168  In short, compatibilist 
theories are not just good on their merits—not just good because they 
accurately capture or rationalize our blaming practices—they are good, 
too, because they protect blame from the rising tide of causal 
explanation. 
One way to understand compatibilism, then, is to give it an 
instrumental account.  Compatibilism is in part a reaction to powerful 
articulations of causal accounts of human acts.  As explanations of events 
in terms of their causes have become more common, anxious questions 
have arisen.169  How can actors be morally responsible in a determined 
universe?  How can we continue to blame and punish if determinism is 
true?  How can we justify our retributive urges?170  Compatibilist 
philosophers have offered compatibilism as an answer to these questions, 
and a salve for the anxiety they entail.  There is no need to give up 
blaming and punishing, they say, for blame and punishment are not 
moored in “metaphysical” freedom.  In short, compatibilism has been  
 
                                                     
 162. DENNETT, supra note 11, at 157. 
 163. Strawson, supra note 9, at 122. 
 164. MOORE, supra note 1, at 547. 
 165. FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 54 (emphasis added). 
 166. Id. at 253. 
 167. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 225. 
 168. Id. at 224. 
 169. Kane, supra note 11, at 3. 
 170. “[O]ur understanding of the influence of genetic endowment and the environment on 
human conduct and character is constantly advancing, and this presses horizon issues [that is, issues 
about human responsibility,] on us with increasing force,” such that “to refuse to consider them 
seems mere evasion.”  Russell, supra note 18, at 249–50. 
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fashioned and marketed for its ability to salvage blame in a time of 
causal explanation.  This is one of its central projects.171 
If this is one of compatibilism’s central projects, it is not hard to see 
why compatibilists are reluctant to attend to the sorts of hard social 
conditions endemic to modern Western society, for it is not clear that 
attending to hard social conditions is compatible with compatibilism’s 
project.  For one thing, hard social conditions are likely to be implicated 
in a very broad swatch of cases of antisocial conduct.  If they have or can 
have excusing significance, the threat of overbroad excuse reappears.  
Moreover, hard social conditions affect conduct in a way that makes 
them similar to certain other phenomena, including genetic inheritance, 
formative family experience, and cultural conditioning, each of which 
also generates and sustains desires and dispositions in holistic, 
incremental ways, and each of which seems likely to be in play in many 
cases of antisocial conduct.172  If hard social conditions can have 
excusing significance, these sorts of phenomena may have it too—
making the threat of overbroad excuse even more pressing.  Thus, where 
contemporary compatibilism’s focus on cataclysmic incapacities and 
outlandish sources of desire/disposition formation assures that excuses 
will be available only in rare cases, attention to hard social conditions—
and to other, similar phenomena—threatens to make excuses available in 
many or most cases of human conduct.  At the very least, it generates a 
thorny problem of sorting holistic, desire/disposition-forming 
phenomena that excuse from those that do not—and doing so in a way 
that sustains blame in a significant portion of cases.  If one of 
compatibilism’s projects is to protect blame from being overrun, then, 
giving holistic desire/disposition-forming phenomena like hard social 
conditions excusing significance may seem dangerously like stepping out 
                                                     
 171. This instrumental characterization of compatibilism raises the possibility that some of the 
energy in the free will debates arises from a sort of internecine struggle between old and new 
manifestations of individualist ideology.  An outdated and increasingly ineffective individualist 
paradigm (free will) is being overtaken, torn down, and discarded by another “updated” individualist 
paradigm (compatibilism) that does a better job of advancing individualist ideology in contemporary 
society.  The old one (free will) is outdated in that it cannot advance the individualist account very 
effectively in the face of the causal explanations that pervade modern popular political culture; the 
new one (compatibilism) is more effective precisely because it dispatches modern causal explanation 
so well—by declaring most such explanation irrelevant.  The old paradigm—having fought off all 
challengers for several centuries, and having insinuated itself into popular philosophy in a hundred 
different ways—will not go easily into the night, and so the struggle between old and new 
individualist paradigms electrifies the free will debates. 
 172. See NORRIE, supra note 70, at 169 (“There is no getting away from our existence in 
families, neighborhoods, environments, social classes and politics”; “[i]t is these contexts that deal 
us the card which we play . . . .”; and “individual actions are . . . mediated and conditioned” by 
“social context.”). 
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onto a steep and slippery slope, at the bottom of which is the very sort of 
overly broad excuse that compatibilism is constructed to avoid. 
This is not to say that it would be impossible to conceive a version of 
compatibilism that drew the line differently, and made room for 
consideration of mundane, widespread social conditions like poverty and 
inequality, or for holistic, desire/disposition-shaping phenomena 
generally.  Rather, the point is that it may be so dangerous to do so (from 
the compatibilist’s point of view) that compatibilists will typically prefer 
other, less perilous routes, as they have so far, and that theorists who can 
tolerate the possibility of such broad excuse will also be dispositionally 
receptive to the intuitively appealing origination requirement as well.  If 
so, resistance to social conditions is likely to be at least a stubborn 
feature of compatibilism. 
B. Originationism as More Attentive to Hard Social Conditions 
While compatibilism is structurally ill-equipped and dispositionally 
unlikely to attend to hard social conditions, originationism has features 
that make it well-suited to accommodate our intuitions about hard social 
conditions and responsibility.  This is so because originationism can use 
a wider lens in its responsibility inquiry, and because the inquiry that 
originationism mandates—the causal inquiry—is more attuned to the 
way we think about the relationship between hard social conditions and 
antisocial conduct. 
Recall that the originationist responsibility inquiry can be broader 
than the compatibilist inquiry.173  Originationism places limits on who 
can be blamed; it does not limit who can be excused.  Thus, an 
originationist can accept any of the compatibilist excusing conditions, 
and engage in any of the responsibility inquiries that the compatibilist 
might engage in.  But the originationist must also go further.  Unlike the 
compatibilist, the originationist must excuse actors whose acts are caused 
by forces beyond their control.  Thus, the originationist may engage in 
the same sorts of feature/opportunity, ownership, and evidentiary 
inquires that the compatibilist engages in, but he must also make the 
further inquiry into whether the actor’s acts were caused by forces 
beyond his control—entirely apart from whether such forces deprived 
him of particular features, instilled in him alien attitudes, or foreclosed a  
 
                                                     
 173. See Delgado, supra note 11, at 22 (characterizing Bazelon’s originationist rotten-social-
background defense as entailing a “broadened inquiry into culpability”); Wright, supra note 71, at 
463 (characterizing responsibility inquiries that exclude social conditions as “truncated” inquiries). 
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fair opportunity to act.  In this sense, the originationist inquiry can be 
broader than compatibilism’s.174 
Moreover, originationism’s attention to causation makes it more 
likely to make hard social conditions a part of this broad inquiry.  This is 
so because originationism is attuned to causation, and most of us are 
susceptible to the idea that common hard social conditions play a causal 
role in human acts.175  This is not to say that we are convinced that all 
bad acts are the product of hard social conditions; most people probably 
do not believe that.  Nor is it to say that we are confident in our ability to 
map out the causal relationships between particular hard social 
conditions and specific bad acts.  On the contrary, we often have deep 
misgivings about efforts to explain specific acts by reference to particular 
causes, social or otherwise.  Nor is it to suggest that we are likely to 
spontaneously imagine such explanations.  As Part IV will suggest, our 
sensitivity to such causal explanations is probably susceptible to 
manipulation.  Nevertheless, most of us are open to the possibility that 
there are causal explanations for at least some human acts, and that 
common hard social conditions like poverty, inequality, and 
discrimination have a place in some of these explanations.  As a result, 
when an actor claims that hard social conditions played a causal role in 
her act, the originationist is likely to listen.  The originationist considers 
such claims empirically plausible (as most of us do) and morally relevant 
(as originationists, but not compatibilists, do).176 
In short, the originationist is more likely to inquire into hard social 
conditions than the compatibilist.  Originationism is amenable to any 
responsibility inquiry the compatibilist might make, but it also mandates 
further inquiry.  Moreover, originationism’s attention to causation makes 
it naturally interested in the relationship between hard social conditions 
and crime.  Thus, where compatibilism tends to marginalize or make 
                                                     
 174. See Corrado, supra note 3, at 1192 (noting that originationism is more likely than 
compatibilism to accommodate “abusive background” defenses and “genetic constitution” defenses). 
 175. See Delgado, supra note 11, at 66 n.370 (noting that while we generally cannot be 
absolutely certain of the way social conditions cause acts, science, “intuitive wisdom,” and 
“common sense” can flesh out causal accounts sufficiently for us to rely upon them); id. at 20 
(“[E]nvironment must be accounted for in assessing criminal responsibility . . . .”); id. at 23–34 
(providing thorough (though perhaps outdated) catalog of conventional theories about the ways in 
which hard social conditions cause criminal conduct); John L. Hill, Freedom, Determinism, and the 
Externalization of Responsibility in Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2048 (1988) 
(surveying various causal accounts of human conduct, acknowledging present uncertainty about 
precise details of such accounts, but confident that such accounts exist). 
 176. See Vuoso, supra note 54, at 1661 (noting that “[i]t is a widely held belief that a 
disadvantaged socio-economic background can mitigate or eliminate responsibility” and associating 
this view with orignationism). 
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invisible the connections between hard social conditions and antisocial 
conduct, such connections are solidly in originationism’s sight lines. 
C. Summary 
Compatibilism and originationism, then, treat social conditions 
differently.  Contemporary compatibilism’s responsibility inquiries are 
unlikely to attend to hard social conditions in a meaningful way, and 
there is reason to believe that this is at least a stubborn feature of 
compatibilism.  Originationism, in contrast, is more likely to consider the 
role that hard social conditions play in a human act, and thus to attend to 
social conditions while evaluating an actor’s responsibility.  The next 
Part shows that this difference has political ramifications in the context 
of the criminal law. 
IV. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMPATIBILIST CRIMINAL 
LAW 
Because compatibilism and originationism take such different 
approaches to hard social conditions, compatibilist and originationist 
criminal justice systems influence the allocation of power and resources 
in society in different ways.  Thus, cultivating a compatibilist criminal 
law can have political consequences.  This Part describes two such 
consequences.  Part IV.A argues that a compatibilist criminal law is more 
likely to disrupt criticism of and challenges to the social status quo.  This 
is because the compatibilist criminal law’s unwillingness to consider 
social conditions in the responsibility inquiry can impair popular 
recognition of the links between social conditions and crime.  Part IV.B 
contends that a compatibilist criminal law is more likely to facilitate the 
state’s use of violence to reinforce the status quo.  This is because its 
resistance to social condition excuses makes it more likely to authorize 
the state to act violently against the disadvantaged, perpetuating their 
disadvantage and deterring them from engaging in social criticism and 
resistance.177  Thus, the more the state commits to the compatibilist 
approach to criminal law, the more powerful the ideological and coercive 
weapons it can use to defend the social order. 
                                                     
 177. Part IV.A, it might be said, is about the compatibilist criminal law as political persuasion.  
Part IV.B is about the compatibilist criminal law as political violence. 
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A. Compatibilism and Ideology: How the Compatibilist Criminal Law 
Disrupts Criticism of the Status Quo 
Modern Western states like the United States have significant crime 
problems, and such crime problems have the potential to catalyze 
criticism of and challenges to the existing social order.  The intensity of 
this threat, however, can be influenced by the state’s approach to 
criminal responsibility.  Here, I argue that the more the state takes the 
compatibilist approach to criminal responsibility, the less likely it is that 
the crime problem will catalyze such challenges, for a compatibilist 
criminal law disrupts popular sensitivity to the part social conditions play 
in the crime problem. 
1. The Crime Problem as a Potential Catalyst for Challenges to the 
Social Order  
The United States (like many modern Western states) has an 
enormous crime problem.  In a typical year, there are more than five 
million violent crimes in the United States,178 including between fifteen 
and twenty-five thousand criminal homicides,179 two-hundred thousand 
reported sexual assaults,180 and one million aggravated assaults.181  There 
are also more than eighteen million property crimes each year, including 
more than three million burglaries.182  
Needless to say, crime on this scale entails significant physical and 
psychological suffering for an enormous number of crime victims, as 
well as their families and friends.  It also exacts an extraordinary 
                                                     
 178. SHANNAN N. CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2004, at 2 
tbl.1 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv04.pdf. 
 179. See id. (16,500 in 2004; 15,900 in 2003).  Since 1990, the number has ranged between 
approximately 15,000 and approximately 25,000.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTCIS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S.: HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION, 1950–2004 (2006), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/totalstab.htm. 
 180. According to the Bureau of Justice National Crime Victimization Survey, there were 
198,850 rapes and sexual assaults reported in 2003, and 209,880 in 2004.  CATALANO, supra note 
178, at 2 tbl.1.  The actual number of rapes and sexual assaults is likely much higher, as these crimes 
are notoriously underreported. 
 181. Id.  There are typically more than four million simple and aggravated assaults combined.  
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2003 STATISTICAL TABLES (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ 
pdf/cvus03.pdf (4,606,740 in 2003). 
 182. See CATALANO, supra note 178, at 2 tbl.1 (18,626,000 in 2003; 18,654,000 in 2004).  The 
figures include more than three million household burglaries and more than one million auto thefts 
each year.  Id. 
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economic cost.  In the United States, the medical expenses, lost wages, 
and other tangible costs associated with crime can exceed one hundred 
billion dollars in one year.183  Federal, state, and municipal governments 
spend well over one hundred billion dollars a year on the law 
enforcement, investigation, judicial proceedings, and correctional 
facilities dedicated to prosecuting and punishing crime.184  Adding the 
cost of private security measures and other costs of crime, “[t]he net 
annual burden of crime [may] . . . exceed $1 trillion.”185  And none of 
this takes account of the other ways the crime problem impoverishes 
us—by causing us to worry about crime even when we ourselves are not 
victims, making us reluctant to travel to certain places or at certain times, 
or inducing us to tolerate a regime of uncomfortably intrusive police 
practices. 
The natural responses to a social phenomenon responsible for so 
much suffering and such extraordinary costs include fear, frustration, 
resentment, and anger.  The natural sequel to such dissonant feelings is a 
demand for change.  But just what should be changed?  The answer to 
that question has political significance.  Should citizens come to see 
existing social conditions as significantly implicated in the crime 
problem, the desire for change may become a desire for social 
transformation, and this desire may catalyze challenges to the existing 
social order. 
2. How Compatibilism Disrupts Challenges to the Social Order 
The crime problem will only catalyze challenges to the social order if 
the populace sees the social order as implicated in the crime problem.  
The state can influence the extent to which the populace makes this 
connection by its approach to criminal responsibility: the more the state 
                                                     
 183. See TED R. MILLER ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT: VICTIM 
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 6 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/ 
victcost.pdf (summing cost of crime victim medical expenses, lost earnings, and “public program” 
costs to $105 billion and speculating that “pain, suffering, and the reduced quality of life increases 
the cost of crimes of victims to an estimated $450 billion annually,” with $426 billion attributable to 
violent crime and $24 billion to property crime). 
 184. “Direct expenditure for police protection, judicial and legal services, and correctional 
activities in 2001 in the United States was a record $167 billion for local, state and federal 
government.”  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES 
AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2001 (2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
jeeus01.pdf.  This included $72,406,000,000 on law enforcement, $37,571,000,000 for judicial 
expenditures, and $56,956,871,000 for corrections.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, DIRECT EXPENDITURES BY CRIMINAL JUSTICE FUNCTION, 1982–2003 (2006), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/exptyptab.htm. 
 185. David A. Anderson, The Aggregate Burden of Crime, 42 J.L. & ECON. 611, 611 (1999). 
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adheres to a compatibilist approach to criminal responsibility, the less 
sensitive the populace will be to the relationship between social 
conditions and crime, and the less likely it will be that the crime problem 
will issue in challenges to the social order. 
The argument here assumes that the state’s approach to criminal 
responsibility influences the way citizens in general think about criminal 
responsibility.  The common view that the criminal law serves an 
educative function supports this assumption: if prohibitory norms are 
disseminated and inculcated through the criminal law,186 it is likely that 
the theory of responsibility is also bound up with these norms.  More 
concretely, when the state adopts a theory of criminal responsibility, state 
actors become public advocates for that theory.  Legislators, judges, and 
executive actors articulate it in explicit and implicit, complete and 
incomplete ways.  As they do so, they make the theory intellectually 
accessible and give it the seal of authoritative approval.  At the same 
time, state institutions model the application of the theory.  In particular, 
the state’s criminal courts apply the theory to tangible cases in a vivid, 
endlessly repetitive way, demonstrating it not only for all those who 
participate in the trial, but also for all those otherwise interested in the 
outcome and for the community as a whole.187  Such modeling makes the 
state’s approach to criminal responsibility seem not just comprehensible 
and appealing, but normal and inevitable.  Thus, the state’s approach to 
criminal responsibility is likely to influence the way the populace thinks 
about criminal responsibility.188 
By influencing the way the populace thinks about criminal 
responsibility, the state influences the populace’s sensitivity to the 
connections between social conditions and the crime problem.189  As we 
have seen, some ways of thinking about criminal responsibility are more 
likely to identify connections between social conditions and crime than 
others are, for the different approaches to responsibility show different 
                                                     
 186. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471 
(1997) (criminal law plays a “central role in the creation of shared norms”). 
 187. See David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 391 
(1976) (criminal trials are an opportunity for the “community . . . to learn . . . and . . . understand . . . 
the criminal responsibility issue”); see also Delgado, supra note 11, at 21 n.82 (noting that while 
there are a variety of ways to educate the public about crime, “the lesson society learns [from 
criminal trials] . . . [is] uniquely and conspicuously urgent”); Robinson & Darley, supra note 186, at 
472 (noting the educative impact of “law enforcement and adjudication activities”). 
 188. This point is implicit in Boldt’s contention that the criminal law “is a vital societal 
mechanism by which [the individualist] perspective [regarding responsibility] is created and 
maintained, and the causal . . . perspective obscured.”  Richard Boldt, The Construction of 
Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2245, 2247 (1992). 
 189. Delgado, supra note 11, at 21. 
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levels of interest in social conditions.  Where the state models and 
recommends the originationist approach, citizens will learn to evaluate 
individual responsibility by inquiring into (among other things) the 
causes of antisocial conduct.190  Given the plausibility of the view that 
hard social conditions can cause antisocial conduct, such citizens will 
naturally consider whether hard social conditions are involved in 
individual cases.  As a result, the more closely the state hones to the 
originationist approach, the more the state encourages the populace to 
contemplate and debate the connections between individual antisocial 
acts and the broader social context.  In such a state, we should expect to 
see claims and theories about the role of social conditions in crime 
playing a significant role in judgments about individual criminal 
responsibility and in discussion of the crime problem generally.191 
The more the state pursues the compatibilist approach, on the other 
hand, the more it discourages contemplation and discussion of the 
connection between social conditions and crime.  Where the state models 
and recommends the compatibilist approach, citizens will learn to 
evaluate individual responsibility by making feature/opportunity 
inquiries, ownership inquiries, and related evidentiary inquiries, and they 
will be sensitized to bizarre and transitory desire and disposition-shaping 
phenomena (nefarious hypnotists and their ilk); but they will not so 
readily recognize phenomena that shape actors’ desires and dispositions 
in gradual and holistic ways, as common social conditions do.  In such a 
state, we should not expect claims and theories about the role of social 
conditions in crime to play a significant part in judgments about 
                                                     
 190. In fact, it appears that citizens in our society do think this way, at least some of the time.  
See supra Part III.A.  This is at least indirect evidence against the descriptive claim that there is no 
originationism in our criminal law, and it is consistent with the more realistic claim that our criminal 
law contains both originationist and compatibilist strands.  I say more about this in Part V. 
 191. See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 965 (1973) (per curiam) (reasoning that 
adopting the rotten-social-background defense will lead us to see the role of socioeconomic 
inequality in the crime problem); Bazelon, supra note 187, at 391 (suggesting that originationist 
criminal law catalyzes inquiry into “community’s responsibility” for “the criminal act”); Delgado, 
supra note 11, at 21 & n.82 (highlighting the way an originationist rotten-social background defense 
would inspire inquiry into the relationship between social conditions and crime while 
nonoriginationist approach “conceals” such connections); id. at 54 (stating that if the rotten-social-
background defense were adopted, “the societal deprivation which results in crime among the poor 
would be exposed”); id. at 67 (“His or her trial will expose the public to the RSB conditions that 
predisposed the defendant to crime . . . .”); id. at 87 (concluding that having a rotten-social-
background defense “can enable society to recognize . . . the causes of environmentally induced 
alienation and anger”); Falk, supra note 128, at 811 (noting that recognition of social conditions 
defenses correlates with the recognition of society’s “sometimes deleterious effects on the human 
psyche”); Hill, supra note 175, at 2071 (stating that if we use an originationist approach that 
properly accounts for “genetic, socioeconomic, and environmental factors,” then “society itself 
becomes responsible” and “society’s collective attention may be directed to those larger conditions 
which cause, and become manifest in, individual deviant acts”). 
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individual responsibility, nor in discussion of the crime problem 
generally.  On the contrary, such claims and theories will be hard to 
conceive and articulate, and even when offered they will seem 
controversial,192 unreliable,193 pathological,194 and corrupt.195  In short, 
the more the state takes the compatibilist approach to criminal 
responsibility, the more unlikely it is the populace will see social 
conditions as implicated in crime in a significant way.196 
It follows that the state’s approach to criminal responsibility can 
significantly influence whether the crime problem generates popular 
challenges to the social order.  The more the state takes the originationist 
approach, the more readily the populace will associate social conditions 
with the crime problem; and the more the populace associates social 
conditions with the crime problem, the more likely it is that the populace 
will seek to alleviate the enormous suffering and costs associated with 
the crime problem through criticism of and challenges to the existing 
social order.197  If citizens perceive that social conditions are bound up 
                                                     
 192. Compatibilist theorists commonly warn that originationist claims are “controversial,” 
WOLF, supra note 16, at 39, or “complex and contentious,” FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 
187. 
 193. Originationist intuitions will be treated as optical illusions—enticing, but fundamentally 
misleading.  See MOORE, supra note 1, at 544 (comparing our originationist intuitions about social 
conditions to our perceptions of sticks half-submerged in water, which appear bent even though they 
are not).  It will be said that they cannot bear “too much weight,” WOLF, supra note 16, at 39, and 
should be put aside in favor of “clear[er] cases,” FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 43, at 187. 
 194. Originationist ideas will be seen as a kind of obsessive idealism, a “misplaced reverence for 
an absolutist ideal.”  DENNETT, supra note 11, at 165.  “St. Peter may wish to do greater ‘fine 
tuning,’ but the law should not.”  Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
1485, 1499 (1984). 
 195. Originationist claims will be said to harbor secret “elitism and condescension,” and to deny 
“the equal moral dignity of others.”  MOORE, supra note 1, at 545–46; see also id. at 148–49 (“Such 
discrimination is a temptation to be restricted, because it is no virtue.  It is élitist and condescending 
toward others not to grant them the same responsibility and desert you grant to yourself.”).  For 
another account suggesting that there is something corrupt about these sympathetic attitudes, see 
DENNETT, supra note 11, at 167. 
 196. See Delgado, supra note 11, at 21 & n.82 (suggesting that adoption of an originationist 
rotten-social-background defense would have this effect). 
 197. See GOLASH, supra note 128, at 120, 149, 153 (recognizing role of social circumstances in 
crime leads us to see that “it is inappropriate for the state to seek to improve [wrongdoers] characters 
rather than change their circumstances,” and provides “incentive for more aggressive attempts to 
address the broad social causes of crime” and for “address[ing] the structural, cultural, and 
psychological causes of crime”); Arenella, supra note 58, at 83 (seeing how hard social conditions 
undermine moral development “might motivate us to do something about those conditions”); 
Delgado, supra note 11, at 21 & n.82 (suggesting that if populace sees social conditions like poverty 
and inequality as implicated in crime, populace “would presumably decide to do something about” 
this, people would develop an “urgent” “determination to alter the social conditions which breed 
crime,” they would seek “income redistribution coupled with other social reform measures,” and 
“the lesson society learns [from presentation of an rotten-social-background defense in a criminal 
trial] and its determination to alter the social conditions which breed crime are uniquely and 
conspicuously urgent”); Hill, supra note 175, at 2045, 2071–72 (suggesting that the originationist 
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with crime, they “may . . . take measures to avoid creating additional 
[rotten-social-background] individuals”;198 they may seek “income 
redistribution,”199 “egalitarian redistribution of opportunities,”200 “social 
reconstruction,”201 and “other reform measures”202 as “indispensable first 
steps toward solving the problem of violent crime.”203  They may choose 
to “underwrite a legal and political process of egalitarian redistribution of 
freedom, control, and knowledge in favor of the most deprived.”204 
On the other hand, the more the state takes the compatibilist 
approach, the more unlikely it is that the populace will make such 
challenges to the social order.205  In the compatibilist state, citizens are 
unlikely to see connections between social conditions and the crime 
problem, and if citizens do not see such connections, the crime problem 
will not inspire criticism of or challenges to the social order.  Instead, the 
anguish and frustration generated by the crime problem will be directed 
at other, more “visible”206 sources of crime.  “Common sense” will 
declare that because “crimes and moral wrongs are ultimately committed 
by individual agents,” solutions to the crime problem must focus on 
reforming, rewiring, constraining, or eliminating the individuals who 
engage in antisocial conduct.207  Alternatively, citizens will focus their 
                                                                                                                       
approach motivates “action against larger institutions” and attending to “the causes of negative 
behavior” leads to “reorganizing social institutions and addressing environmental concerns”). 
 198. Delgado, supra note 11, at 67. 
 199. See id. at 21 (referencing United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(per curiam) (Bazelon, J., dissenting)); see also GOLASH, supra note 128, at 155–56 (discussing the 
relationship between crime and income inequality). 
 200. See Wright, supra note 71, at 500 (suggesting that this might be necessary to enable 
deprived actors to become responsible actors). 
 201. This is Judge Bazelon’s phrase.  Alexander, 471 F.2d at 965. 
 202. Delgado, supra note 11, at 21. 
 203. Alexander, 471 F.2d at 965. 
 204. Wright, supra note 71, at 502; see also GOLASH, supra note 128, at 155–72 (discussing 
alternative ways of preventing and responding to crimes). 
 205. See Bazelon, supra note 187, at 401–02 (noting how different approaches to punishment 
link up with “alternative responses to the crime problem,” including different attitudes toward 
addressing the “social and economic causes of crime”); Delgado, supra note 11, at 21  (referencing 
Alexander, 471 F.2d at 965, and noting Judge Bazelon’s view that the insanity defense, which fails 
to account for impact of social conditions on mental functioning, “conceals the need for . . . 
reform”); cf. Wright, supra note 71, at 486 (making the distinct but related point that “to refuse to 
recognize the possibility of nonresponsibility due to severe deprivation is to fail to recognize the 
profound moral importance of reforming the conditions of social life”). 
 206. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 70, at 135 (“Because of our biases, individuals most 
likely to be held personally responsible are the salient individuals closest to the injury . . . .”). 
 207. See Stephen J. Morse, Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility, 19 LAW & PHIL. 3, 
44–45 (2000) (explaining that social explanations for crime should not “undermine our view that 
most wrongdoers are responsible agents”).  “Consideration of remote causes is of no help . . . .  
Rather, we must find the person in who the decisive junction of causes lies.”  Schlick, supra note 47, 
at 54, 61.  Thus, if we have a crime problem, it is because individual actors fail to “buck up.”  
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ire on the law enforcement machinery that “fails to prevent” that 
conduct, or the educational institutions that fail to instill proper values.  
In oceanic moments, they will rail against—or resign themselves to—
“evil” itself.208  Insensitive to the criminogenic effects of social 
conditions, the populace will naturally turn its frustration and anguish 
about the crime problem on other targets, leaving the social order 
undisturbed.  In short, the more the state takes the compatibilist 
approach, the more unlikely it is that the crime problem will catalyze 
challenges to the social order. 
This is not, of course, an air-tight dynamic.  For example, it is likely 
that some people will be stubborn originationists, no matter what the 
state does.  Even if the state takes and aggressively promotes a 
compatibilist approach to criminal responsibility, stubborn originationists 
will continue to think about the role of social conditions in antisocial 
conduct, and, as a result, to generate social criticism.  But we should not 
expect such holdouts to be very common.  The state is an influential 
opinion leader, and the state can articulate and model its preferred 
approach over and over again through the tens of thousands of criminal 
trials that take place every year.  It is fair to expect that the state’s 
approach will have a significant influence on how many—even if not 
all—citizens think about criminal responsibility. 
                                                                                                                       
Morse, supra note 86, at 1617–18.  After all, “[h]ow hard is it not to offend the law?  The criminal 
law sets very low standards; it asks very little of us . . . .  [I]t is simply not that hard to obey.”  
Morse, supra note 194, at 1498–99; see also Arenella, supra note 54, at 1614 (recognizing that 
“some moral agents will have a far easier time than others in exercising their moral capacities,” but 
emphasizing that “the moral norms implicated by crimes barring physical and sexual violence 
against other human beings place minimal restraints on the agent’s ability to pursue his own 
interests”).  Thus, as one theorist observes, the “concept of responsibility” is used to “delineate the 
boundaries between those consequences for which the individual will be held accountable and those 
for which society will be so held.”  Hill, supra note 175, at 2046; see also Arenella, supra note 54, at 
1533 (affixing moral blame to harm-causers “soothe[s] our collective social conscience”); J.M. 
Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 262 (1990) (“To the extent that we 
believe that the cause of poverty is individual sloth, we divert blame from social practices and 
institutions.”). 
Deirdre Golash observes that “retributivists tend to assume that the rate of crime at any given 
moment is a result of the choices of individuals who choose to commit crimes.”  GOLASH, supra 
note 128, at 90.  I agree with Golash, but add the observation that among retributivists, 
compatibilists are more likely to focus on the responsibility of the individual than originationists, 
especially as causal accounts of human acts gain currency. 
 208. Moore, for example, invites us to vent our frustration about the crime problem against 
“evil” itself.  “[T]here is such a thing as evil . . . it is . . . a part of creatures not so different from 
ourselves.”  MOORE, supra note 1, at 142.  One might say that what Moore has done is hone in on 
the space usually occupied by social conditions in our explanations of human acts, and replaced 
those social conditions with the phenomenon he calls “evil.”  Curiously, Moore at one point makes 
what seems almost a Freudian slip: urging us to see actors as bad in themselves, he declares that “we 
live in a society in which there really are fearful and awful people.”  Id. at 143 (emphasis added).  
Though he means to emphasize the “evil” in individuals, he seems at the same time to inadvertently 
indict the society (it is the sort of society in which bad people appear). 
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It is also true that even if citizens take the compatibilist approach, 
and therefore decline to inquire into social conditions when trying to 
determine criminal responsibility, they might still look into the 
relationship between social conditions and antisocial conduct for other 
reasons—such as figuring out how to solve the crime problem.  After all, 
it is perfectly possible to separate these two questions: (1) Does this actor 
deserve punishment?  (2) Why did this actor commit this act?  A person 
might block out social conditions while answering the “desert” question, 
yet be receptive to causal claims about social conditions while answering 
the “why” question.  There is certainly nothing logically inconsistent 
about doing so.  But, again, we should not overestimate the likelihood 
that citizens will separate the “desert” question from the “why” question.  
For one thing, the “desert” question generally seems more vivid and 
pressing than the question of why a person did what he did.209  The 
“desert” question, after all, is bound up with urgent and visceral feelings 
in a way the “why” question generally is not—it helps us figure out 
where to direct our angry, vengeful, resentful reactive attitudes.  For 
another thing, while the “desert” question and the “why” question are 
logically separate questions, it is easy to conflate them.  If the “desert” 
question yields the answer that the actor is “responsible” for his crime, it 
is easy (and psychologically economical) to slip into thinking that this 
means that the significant causes of his crime are in him, not his 
circumstances.210  As a result, we are more likely to try to answer the 
“desert” question than the “why” question, and answering the “desert” 
question will often exhaust our interest and/or draw our attention to 
powerful and distracting reactive emotions.211  Thus, if our analysis of 
the “desert” question does not attend to social conditions, we will often 
overlook inquiry into social conditions entirely. 
The claim here is not that the state can turn on and off our sensitivity 
to the connections between social conditions and crime, like a light bulb.  
Obviously, we are not such puppets to the state, nor such single-minded 
thinkers.  But there are good reasons to expect that the state’s approach 
                                                     
 209. See Delgado, supra note 11, at 21 n.82 (stating that while there are in theory a number of 
ways to lead people to think about social conditions and crime, criminal trials are “uniquely and 
conspicuously urgent”). 
 210. See Hill, supra note 175, at 2067 (“When an unfortunate or harmful event occurs there is a 
natural human tendency to discover its cause.  The notion of responsibility meets this need: by 
making one or more persons ‘responsible’ for an act, we pick them out as the ‘cause’ of the act.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 211. See id. (noting that attributing responsibility to individuals can serve a “scapegoat function . 
. . placing the blame on an individual or group who is not a significant contributor to the harm at 
issue”). 
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to criminal responsibility is likely to influence the way most of us think 
about criminal responsibility most of the time, and good reasons to think 
that our approach to criminal responsibility will influence whether and 
how much we look into the role of social conditions in crime.  If this is 
true, the state’s adoption of the compatibilist approach to criminal 
responsibility can go some distance toward impairing or blunting our 
sensitivity to the contribution of social conditions to crime, and thereby 
diminish the likelihood that we will vent our frustration about the crime 
problem against the existing social order. 
In this sense, the choice between originationism and compatibilism 
involves a secret politics.  The originationist approach to criminal 
responsibility can catalyze potentially transformative scrutiny of the 
social order; the compatibilist approach is more likely to defuse social 
criticism by keeping the undesirable criminogenic features of hard social 
conditions hidden from critical view.  To choose compatibilism over 
originationism is, then, to choose an approach that favors maintenance of 
the existing social order, and to reject an approach more conducive to 
social change.212 
B. Compatibilism and Coercion: How the Compatibilist Criminal Law 
Facilitates State Violence in Defense of the Social Order 
There is another politically significant difference between the 
compatibilist criminal law and the originationist criminal law: the 
compatibilist criminal law is more conducive to state violence in defense 
of the social order. 
The argument in this Subpart starts with the straightforward 
observations that criminal punishment is a significant form of state 
violence, that the state can at least partially “legitimate” this sort of 
violence by making criminal responsibility a prerequisite for punishment, 
and that this legitimating strategy can have the effect of constraining the 
state’s use of the punishment power.  Building on these premises, this 
Subpart shows that originationist and compatibilist approaches to 
                                                     
 212. While this feature of the compatibilist criminal law usually remains beneath the surface, it 
does occasionally erupt into view.  Thus, one compatibilist theorist, critiquing an apparently 
originationist rotten-social-background defense proposal, warns us that the proposal really aims at or 
suggests “massive redistribution of wealth,” Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: 
A Final Word, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (1976), “social engineering . . . incompatible with a 
libertarian and capitalist society,” id., “social reforms [that] would leave little private wealth for 
individual citizens,” Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge 
Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1261 (1976) [hereinafter Morse, Reply], and, ultimately, the 
overthrow of our “political and economic system.”  Id. 
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responsibility constrain this sort of state violence in different ways, and 
that, under certain conditions, the compatibilist criminal law is more 
conducive to the use of state violence against the disadvantaged.  This, in 
turn, has political consequences.  It means that the compatibilist criminal 
law better enables the state to use the punishment power to disempower 
those at the bottom of the social order, and to suppress their criticism of 
the status quo. 
1. Punishment as State Violence 
The modern state typically claims the authority to treat men brutally 
in at least two sorts of situations:213 it claims the authority to engage in 
war and the authority to punish its criminals.214  The authority to inflict 
violence in the course of war is said to be a narrow one: it exists in 
certain sorts of emergencies, and it does not entail any sort of general 
authority to inflict violence directly upon the state’s own citizens.  The 
authority to punish criminals is not subject to such limitations; it 
authorizes the state to inflict violence on its own citizens, and to do so on 
a massive scale. 
And, indeed, that is what the typical modern state does.  In the name 
of criminal punishment, citizens are executed; they are forcibly removed 
from family, home, and community, and placed in physically and 
psychologically torturous conditions for years, decades, and lifetimes; 
their reputations are devastated and their prospects for fruitful lives 
destroyed.215  This year, for example, the United States will hold more 
than two million citizens216—including nearly one out of every one 
hundred men217—in prison.  Many will be assaulted, raped,218 or killed 
                                                     
 213. Various accounts break out the state’s coercive powers in different ways.  For an alternative 
view, see Corrado, supra note 1, at 259, distinguishing retributive punishment from utilitarian 
coercion. 
 214. See PETTIT, supra note 43, at 125–26 (the state “is a collective subject to which we give a 
special status . . . .  [W]e take it to have a uniquely legitimate claim on the use of force . . . even 
when that force is deployed against individual members”); id. at 155 (state has a “monopoly of 
legitimate force . . . [including] a coercive power . . . of punishing those who offend against that 
code, say by imposing fines, imprisonment, or even execution”). 
 215. “These devices are what I call the coercive machinery of the criminal justice system.”  
Corrado, supra note 1, at 262. 
 216. One source puts the total number of prisoners incarcerated in the United States in 2003 at 
2,212,475.  PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2003, at 1 
(2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p03.pdf.  State and federal authorities 
held 1,470,045 prisoners at the end of 2003.  Id. 
 217. See id. (indicating that about one in 109 men were sentenced prisoners under the 
jurisdiction of state or federal authorities). 
 218. Given victim reluctance to report sexual assault and the potential for institutional 
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by fellow prisoners or by guards.219  Some will be executed.  This is state 
violence on a massive scale. 
2. How Making Criminal Responsibility a Prerequisite of Punishment 
Legitimates and Constrains the State’s Violence 
The state’s infliction of such violence can be threatening and 
alienating to the populace, and may trigger popular resentment and 
resistance.  To preserve its punishment power, the state may take steps to 
legitimate its use of that power.  One especially effective legitimating 
strategy is making criminal responsibility a prerequisite for the infliction 
of criminal punishment.  But while this legitimating strategy can shore 
up the state’s power to punish, it can also limit when and against whom 
the punishment power is used. 
When the state inflicts violence on its citizens in a public and 
pervasive way, citizens may wonder what is to stop the state from 
bringing its extraordinary destructive power to bear on them, or on those 
they love, value, or identify with.  They may also find it difficult to 
identify with the state should it inflict suffering arbitrarily or according 
to criteria that do not seem “just,” “moral,” or familiar.220  Because such 
fear and alienation can breed resentment and resistance, states sometimes 
seek to reassure their citizens about their exercise of the punishment 
power by mooring it to politically and morally “legitimate” procedures 
and principles.221  For example, the state may publicly commit to the rule 
of law, due process, and robust adjudicatory institutions, thereby 
reassuring its citizens that the punishment power will not be exercised in 
                                                                                                                       
embarrassment, there is tremendous uncertainty about the number of sexual assaults that are 
committed in U.S. prisons each year.  Publicized guesses range from 200,000, Charles M. Sennott, 
Prison’s Hidden Horror, BOSTON GLOBE, May 1, 1994, available at 1994 WLNR 2057263, to one 
million, Michael Murphy, Prison Culture Twists Spirits of Jailer, Inmates, THE PATRIOT LEDGER 
(Quincy, Mass.), May 26, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 17145715.  “In 1974 it was estimated that 
of the forty-six million Americans who will be arrested at some time in their lives, ten million will 
be raped while in prison. . . .  Rape is ‘rampant’ in our country’s prison system.”  David M. Siegal, 
Rape in Prison and AIDS: A Challenge for the Eighth Amendment Framework of Wilson v. Seiter, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1547 (1992). 
 219. Inmate violations in confinement facilities under federal or state authority between July 1, 
1999, and June 30, 2000: 34,355 assaults on inmates, 51 resulting inmate deaths.  JAMES J. STEPHAN 
& JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITIES (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/csfcf00.pdf. 
 220. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 186, at 457 (arguing that the criminal law’s moral 
credibility is essential to effective crime control, and is enhanced if its application is perceived as 
“doing justice”). 
 221. “The state’s relative monopoly concerning the lawful use of physical violence requires 
legitimation.”  Arenella, supra note 54, at 1533. 
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arbitrary ways.222  In the same vein, the state may publicly commit to a 
theory of or criteria for punishment, communicating the reassuring 
message that it is willing to see its power limited to particular cases and 
giving citizens the impression that they may be able to predict and 
control whether they are in jeopardy of punishment. 
One especially effective legitimating strategy is making individual 
responsibility a prerequisite for punishment.223  By making individual 
responsibility a prerequisite for punishment, the state gives the citizen 
the empowering sense that it is “up to him” whether he will be punished 
at all.224  He will only be punished if he chooses to do wrong; if he does 
wrong, but not by choice, he will not be punished (for he will not be 
“responsible” for his wrong).  This is part of the appeal of the retributive 
approach to punishment: by making individual fault essential to 
punishment, it seems to give the citizen the ability to control whether the 
state will wield its terrible power against him.225  And this is the most 
celebrated feature of choice theories of punishment, which make 
responsible individual choice the sine qua non of criminal punishment.  
Thus, the state can go a long way toward legitimizing its exercise of the 
punishment power by making individual responsibility a prerequisite for 
criminal punishment. 
But committing to a responsibility requirement entails a trade-off for 
the state.  While anchoring the infliction of punishment in such criteria 
makes punishment more acceptable to the populace, it also limits the 
range of cases in which the state can punish.226  If discovered, breach of 
                                                     
 222. See generally NORRIE, supra note 70 (discussing the legitimating function of commitment 
to rule of law).  See also Arenella, supra note 54, at 1533 (discussing the legitimating function of 
commitment to due process). 
 223. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (suggesting that the 
choice theory of punishment is appealing in part because it protects citizens from excessive state 
interference with private lives); NORRIE, supra note 70 (noting that adopting a politically 
individualist approach to punishment legitimates state violence and reassures populace).  See also 
Arenella, supra note 54, at 1533 (linking criminal punishment to a theory of moral responsibility 
results in “legitimation of state coercion”).  “[P]erhaps all this legal rhetoric about ‘just deserts’ and 
moral responsibility is just the law’s way of legitimating one form of human suffering that the state 
employs to defend itself.”  Id. at 1608. 
 224. See HART, supra note 223, at 46–47 (noting that one of the benefits of a choice-based 
theory of punishment is that it gives citizens the reassuring impression that they can avoid 
punishment by making prudent choices); MOORE, supra note 1, at 549–52 (discussing Hart’s view); 
Duff, supra note 56, at 149–50 (describing the basic tenets of choice theory).  Public commitment to 
this sort of theory also creates a point of possible identification between the citizen and the state: the 
citizen is more likely to identify with a state that pledges allegiance to some criteria for punishment 
than with one that forswears any criteria for punishment at all, and if the state’s theory of 
responsibility resonates with the citizen’s, the citizen may feel a real kinship with the state.  See 
Arenella, supra note 54, at 1533. 
 225. NORRIE, supra note 70, at 206; Arenella, supra note 54, at 1532–33.  
 226. See NORRIE, supra note 70, at 206 (retributive approach is both “legitimating” and 
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such promises might trigger anxiety and alienation, diminish the 
perceived legitimacy of the state’s violent acts, and increase the risk of 
popular criticism and resistance.  Thus, when a state shores up its 
authority to punish by tying its exercise of that power to a responsibility 
requirement, its power to punish will be constrained by the conception of 
responsibility it adopts.  The state will not be able to punish an actor who 
does not fit the state’s conception of the responsible actor—at least not 
without calling into question the legitimacy of the state’s exercise of the 
punishment power. 
3. Compatibilism, State Violence, and the Status Quo 
Because compatibilism and originationism take different approaches 
to criminal responsibility, they constrain the state’s exercise of the 
punishment power in different ways.  Assuming we have the ability to 
show causal connections between hard social conditions and human acts 
in a significant set of cases—an assumption I will address further 
below—the compatibilist approach will be more conducive to the use of 
state violence against the disadvantaged than the originationist approach.  
This, in turn, makes the compatibilist approach more solicitous to the 
existing social and political order. 
I use the term “disadvantaged” in a generic sense.  I mean to refer to 
those who share a certain set of hard circumstances—they live in 
substandard conditions, have fewer opportunities than most, and have 
little success influencing the political process.  As the conventional 
wisdom goes, they are typically poor, they are likely to live in blighted 
urban areas or in undeveloped rural areas, they have impaired access to 
education and employment, and they are disproportionately—though not 
exclusively—people of color.227  Put another way, this is the group for 
whom hard social conditions are a chronic condition.  This is also the 
group with the most reason to criticize and challenge the social order. 
The retributivist criminal law, whether originationist or 
compatibilist, will always be a vehicle for state violence (in the form of 
punishment) against the disadvantaged, but the compatibilist criminal 
law is more conducive to such violence than the originationist criminal 
law.  The reason has to do with the way the two approaches to criminal 
responsibility handle hard social conditions.  As we have seen, 
originationism is receptive to claims that hard social conditions should 
                                                                                                                       
“limiting” to “state violence as punishment”). 
 227. Delgado, supra note 11, at 23–37 (describing social conditions associated with 
disadvantage); Wright, supra note 71, at 480–83 (same). 
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excuse.  It is attentive to phenomena that shape desires and dispositions 
in gradual, holistic ways, as social conditions do.  Compatibilism, in 
contrast, prefers to focus on the actor’s features and capacities, and on 
phenomena that influence the actor in transitory and bizarre ways.  As a 
result, compatibilism has little inclination to treat hard social conditions 
as excuses.  The upshot is that in some cases, an originationist criminal 
law will excuse actors because of their exposure to hard social conditions 
while a compatibilist criminal law will not.228 
It follows that the compatibilist criminal law will more frequently 
punish the disadvantaged.  The disadvantaged are chronically exposed to 
hard social conditions.  Assuming, as most criminal theorists do, that 
hard social conditions can play a causal role in antisocial conduct, some 
disadvantaged persons will be caused to commit antisocial acts by 
exposure to hard social conditions.  In an originationist criminal justice 
system, such actors may be able to invoke an excuse grounded in their 
hard social conditions.  A compatibilist criminal justice system, in 
contrast, will rarely, if ever, excuse disadvantaged defendants for such 
reasons.  As a result, there will be a set of cases involving disadvantaged 
defendants in which an originationist criminal law will not authorize the 
state to inflict punishment while a compatibilist criminal law will.  In 
short, compatibilism will authorize punishment of the disadvantaged 
more frequently than originationism will.229 
Again, then, we come upon the compatibilist criminal law’s secret 
politics.  More willing to punish the disadvantaged, the compatibilist 
criminal law will be more favorable to and protective of the status quo.  
Punishment, of course, inflicts many sorts of losses on the punished 
person: it reduces opportunities for productive work, interrupts education 
and skill development, interferes with potentially productive social 
relationships, and catalyzes psychic changes that can undermine 
productivity (e.g., demoralization, depression, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and other mental illnesses).230  It thereby reduces wealth, 
                                                     
 228. Corrado, supra note 8, at 475–76 (the argument that “if a causal chain can be established 
between a deprived and abusive background and a particular crime in a particular case, then the 
crime ought to be excused . . . clearly presupposes incompatibilism and the causal theory” (i.e., 
originationism)).  “The compatibilist has . . . no time . . . for an excuse based on a deprived and 
abusive social background . . . .  The incompatibilist, on the other hand, would need only evidence 
that the criminal behavior was determined by the actor’s background to believe that the behavior 
ought to be excused.”  Id. at 482. 
 229. Boldt makes a similar point about the compatibilist rejection of addiction defenses, which 
he says leads to disproportionate prosecution and punishment of defendants from “distinct, 
subordinated populations,” such as African Americans and Hispanics.  Boldt, supra note 188, at 
2251. 
 230. See WALLACE, supra note 13, at 200 (“[T]he practice of holding people responsible . . . can 
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diminishes opportunity, and retards social mobility for the punished 
person—and, more or less directly, for others in his family and 
community.  Thus, because the compatibilist criminal law authorizes 
punishment of the disadvantaged at a higher rate than the originationist 
criminal law, it does more to perpetuate the disadvantaged status of the 
disadvantaged, and to entrench the existing social order.231 
The compatibilist criminal law will also protect the existing social 
order in another way: it will be more conducive to violence against 
critics and opponents of the status quo than the originationist criminal 
law is.  The disadvantaged are, of course, the group with the strongest 
motive to criticize and resist the status quo.  Thus, we should expect to 
see the disadvantaged playing an important role in the generation of 
challenges to the social order.  A compatibilist criminal law will, as we 
have seen, punish the disadvantaged at a higher rate than an 
originationist criminal law; as a result, it will more often authorize 
punishment against those who actually do challenge social order.  
Indeed, it may even be true that the compatibilist criminal law will more 
frequently authorize the state to punish disadvantaged actors for their 
criticism of or resistance to the status quo.232  An antisocial act may be an 
“indignant claim of right,” or an objection to a legal regime perceived as 
unfair or unjust.233  It may be done to “prevent[] the justly treated 
members of society from being lulled into the belief that the existing 
system operates effectively for all members.”234  Because of “deep social 
alienation,” “marginalized individuals [may] see themselves as locked in 
battle with the forces of order, so that getting away with behavior that 
harms others becomes the goal and refraining from such behavior 
becomes capitulation.”235  In these cases, punishing antisocial acts is 
                                                                                                                       
be thought of as a system for distributing the benefits and burdens of human favor, leaving some 
people—the wrongdoers—notably worse off than others, insofar as they are subjected to the harms 
of censure, reproach, avoidance, withdrawal of esteem, and the like.”). 
 231. Perhaps the compatibilist criminal law will also punish the advantaged at a higher rate than 
the disadvantaged, insofar as it will decline to recognize causal excuses with general application or 
uniquely available to the advantaged.  Even if this is true, however, the effect is unlikely to offset the 
impact on disadvantaged communities, for the disadvantaged engage in potentially criminal 
antisocial conduct at a much higher rate than the advantaged do. 
 232. See Delgado, supra note 11, at 70 (observing that society may “make the egoistic acts of 
criminals illegal because they conflict with the interests of the powerful, while the egoistic acts of 
the powerful are legalized,” thus suggesting a system in which the feature that makes an act criminal 
is just that it threatens the social order preferred by the powerful). 
 233. NORRIE, supra note 70, at 40 (observing that indignation about unjust property regimes has 
sometimes been a motive for certain crimes). 
 234. Delgado, supra note 11, at 60 (emphasis omitted).  Morse is skeptical of this claim.  See 
Morse, supra note 2, at 147 (“Most criminal behavior motivated by deviant subcultural values will 
not be intentionally political acts of civil disobedience or rebellion.”). 
 235. GOLASH, supra note 128, at 155. 
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punishing social criticism, and compatibilism will be more conducive to 
doing so than originationism. 
Of course, all of this depends upon the premise that there is a set of 
cases in which compatibilism authorizes punishment against the 
disadvantaged but originationism does not.  The argument so far has 
assumed that there is a set of such cases—namely, cases in which 
disadvantaged defendants are able to show that their antisocial acts are 
caused by hard social conditions to which they have been chronically 
exposed and which are not excusing in a compatibilist scheme.  But is 
there such a set of cases? 
If we are totally unable to show the causal connections between hard 
social conditions and antisocial conduct, the set of cases here will be 
empty.  Likewise, the set will be empty if we are only able to show 
causal connections in cases involving the outrageous sorts of social 
conditions that also happen to trigger compatibilist excuses (poverty so 
extreme that actors must steal food to avoid starvation; 1984-style state-
sponsored mind control).  Compatibilists are already committed to 
excusing in such cases.  But if we are also able to show that less 
outrageous social conditions cause antisocial conduct, then there is a 
significant set of hard social condition cases that are excused in the 
originationist criminal law but not in the compatibilist criminal law. 
And indeed, there is reason to believe we either already have the 
ability to give such causal explanations in a significant set of cases, or 
are on the verge of having this ability.  One way to show this is to point 
to the progress that sociologists, psychologists, neurobiologists, and 
others have made in refining and developing their accounts of how 
various phenomena—including hard social conditions—catalyze 
antisocial conduct; academic philosophers have taken this tack.236  But 
there is also other evidence, closer to home for the criminal theorist, that 
suggests the same thing.  The evidence I point to here is criminal 
theory’s ongoing struggle to dispatch hard social-condition defenses. 
                                                     
 236. Pereboom writes: 
In recent decades, with advances in psychology, sociology, and neuroscience, the notion 
that certain patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our 
control has become a serious cultural concern.  In our society, the possibility that criminal 
behavior, for example, may be caused by influences in upbringing or by abnormal 
features of the brain is very much a live hypothesis.  Furthermore, many people agree that 
criminals cannot be blameworthy for actions and tendencies produced in this way. 
PEREBOOM, supra note 3, at xiii.  “[L]awyers and judges are plainly interested in evidence showing 
that a person accused of a crime had no control over factors that led to it.”  Russell, supra note 18, at 
249. 
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The last thirty years have seen a steady stream of proposals to excuse 
actors for antisocial acts caused by hard social conditions.  Criminal 
theorists and trial lawyers237 have proposed, for example, that we should 
excuse in cases of “urban psychosis,”238 “black rage,”239 and “involuntary 
rage” triggered by hard social conditions;240 that we should excuse those 
so “isolat[ed] from dominant culture” that they do not know dominant 
culture norms;241 that we should excuse actors who can show that, as a 
result of exposure to hard social conditions, they could not control their 
conduct on a particular occasion;242 and that juries “should hear evidence 
of a defendant’s ‘rotten social background’ and decide for themselves 
whether it mitigates her culpability.”243  Indeed, despite the law’s  
 
                                                     
 237. Falk collects numerous cases.  Falk, supra note 128. 
 238. See id. at 738–41 (defense for defendants driven to mental illness or a “mindset of 
heightened fear and danger” by harsh or violent urban conditions). 
 239. See id. at 748–57 (defense for defendants made mentally ill or explosively sensitive to 
racial affronts by racial discrimination). 
 240. Delgado, supra note 11, at 75–76, 85–87.  Here, Delgado assumes that hard social 
conditions can make actors into “virtual ‘time bombs,’” and that it is unjust to punish an actor when 
he is both turned into a “time bomb” and “triggered” by forces beyond his control.  Id.; see also id. 
at 76 (“The kind of pent-up rage and despair that can result from living in a crowded, violent 
neighborhood can cause an explosion of violence just as disordered brain circuitry can.”). 
 241. Id. at 76, 87–88.  This excuse applies in cases where actors are raised in “cultural islands . . 
. with their own rules, norms and values,” and would “require . . . proof that the defendant did not 
adequately internalize the values of the larger society.”  Id. at 76; see also Wright, supra note 71, at 
473–74 (arguing that knowledge of social norms is necessary to moral responsibility, and that 
“oppressed groups may . . . lack . . . relevant knowledge . . . [as a] result of governmental and 
societal failure to provide [such] . . . knowledge . . . or adequate opportunity to acquire such 
knowledge”). 
 242. Delgado, supra note 11, at 76–77, 88–89.  This excuse “assumes that a rotten social 
background can cause inability to control conduct, as insanity does.”  Id. at 76–77. “My review of 
RSB and criminogenesis showed that inadequate nutrition, exposure to noxious substances, 
inadequate child-rearing practices, and constant stress can seriously impair a person’s ability to 
conform his or her conduct to society’s demands.”  Id. at 88–89.  Bazelon favored an expansive 
version of the insanity defense: on his view, the excuse would apply when an actor’s “mental or 
emotional processes or behavior controls were impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly be 
held responsible for his act.”  Bazelon, supra note 187, at 396 (emphasis omitted).  For Bazelon, this 
test would allow for something approximating a social conditions excuse: he thought social 
conditions worked their criminogenic effect by creating mental abnormalities like “personality 
disorders.”  Id. at 394.  If so, this test would “freely allow expert and lay testimony on . . . 
environmental, cultural, educational [and] economic . . . factors” on the “causes of . . . criminal 
behavior.”  Id. at 396.  On socially primed insanity, see Falk, supra note 128, at 742–48, discussing a 
defense of media intoxication for defendants made mentally ill or driven to criminal acts by 
exposure to media violence. 
 243. Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: 
Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 465 
(1994–1995).  Smith also notes that members of subordinated groups should be able to present 
evidence of severe deprivation to the jury.  Id. at 482. 
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reluctance to explicitly grant such defenses, treatises and textbooks 
routinely cover such proposals in their discussion of excuses.244 
This steady stream of proposals has been fueled by the sense that we 
either already have or will soon have the ability to show that some 
antisocial acts are caused by hard social conditions.  Such ideas run 
through the whole body of literature.  While proponents do not always 
explicitly ground their hard social-condition defenses in causal claims,245 
they often provide extensive catalogs of causal accounts linking hard 
social conditions to antisocial conduct,246 and they recurringly suggest 
that when social conditions “cause” an act, this alone is enough to excuse 
the act.247  By the same token, the critics of these proposals consistently 
                                                     
 244. See generally ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1991); SANFORD H. 
KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (7th ed. 2001); READINGS 
IN CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY (David Dressler ed., 1964). 
 245. For example, on a narrow reading of Falk’s urban psychosis, black rage, and media 
intoxication proposals, Falk is only proposing that the law recognize that certain social conditions 
can render a person insane.  Falk shows that each defense has been used this way and approves the 
practice.  See Falk, supra note 128, at 738–57, 783–98 (“These theories of defense fit within existing 
trends in the evolution of the self-defense doctrine.”).  Likewise, a narrow reading of Delgado’s 
involuntary rage defense is that Delgado is only arguing that the law should recognize that certain 
social conditions can produce involuntary acts.  Similar things can be said about Delgado’s control 
defense and Bazelon’s impairment defense. 
Compatibilists are skeptical about claims that hard social conditions are relevant to their 
nonorigination criteria for blame and excuse.  Moore, for example, reasons that such conditions 
generally do not render a person’s act involuntary, or make a person incapable of practical 
reasoning, or subject an actor to the kind of hard choice that triggers excuse.  MOORE, supra note 1, 
at 525–26, 534, 544–47.  Morse makes a similar point: While “[m]any claim” that hard social 
conditions can “drive people crazy,” and that it is possible to conceive social conditions so harsh that 
they coerce an actor, such cases will “rarely arise.”  Morse, supra note 86, at 1652–53; see also 
Morse, Reply, supra note 212, at 1255 (arguing that there is no “social consensus” that “background 
factors” are “relevant to legal responsibility”).  Hard social conditions may shape character and 
predisposition, but they almost never create “defect[s] of volition, irrationality, external or internal 
coercion, or any other standard excusing condition.”  Morse, supra note 86, at 1653; see also 
Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113, 134 
n.61 (1996) (“[M]ost defendants with a ‘rotten social background’ were rational when they offended 
and were not coerced to commit their crimes.”); Morse, supra note 2, at 141–42 (arguing that hard 
social conditions will almost never rise to the level of genuine coercion); id. at 144 (arguing that 
hard social conditions almost never defeat “the general capacity to be guided by good reason”); 
Morse, supra note 26, at 374–75 (arguing that “new syndromes” are “rarely sufficient to justify a 
colorable claim of legal insanity”). 
 246. Delgado, supra note 11, at 23–34; Falk, supra note 128, at 738–57. 
 247. Delgado, for example, writes, “In some cases, a defendant’s impoverished background so 
greatly determines his or her criminal behavior that we feel it unfair to punish the individual.  . . . 
[B]lame is inappropriate when a defendant’s criminal behavior is caused by extrinsic factors beyond 
his or her control.”  Delgado, supra note 11, at 54–55 (emphasis added).  Likewise, when Bazelon 
questions whether it is appropriate to blame “a poverty stricken and otherwise deprived black youth 
from the central city who kills a marine who taunted him with a racial epithet,” or a “‘modern Jean 
Valjean’ who steals to feed his family,” Bazelon, supra note 187, at 389, he says there is reason to 
doubt that “a free choice to do wrong can be found,” id., using “free choice” in a way that seems to 
oppose it to “causal relationship[s]” and “causal connections,” id. at 390–91.  Bazelon appears to 
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take for granted that causal explanations incorporating social conditions 
are possible.248  They concede that “deprivation or rotten social 
background” can “produce[] character flaws or antisocial 
predispositions,”249 and that “ghetto upbringing may give rise to 
intuitions of excuse.”250  Indeed, they think causal explanations pointing 
to social conditions are not only possible, but so plausible that they 
threaten to lead us into the “cul-de-sac of . . . determinism.”251  Thus, the 
critics do not challenge the assumption that we have the capacity to offer 
pertinent causal explanations; instead, they assail the “persistent but 
implausible claim” that hard social conditions “excuse[] because [they] 
cause[] criminal behavior.”252  “[C]ausation,” they reiterate, “does not 
excuse.”253  In short, as far as both the proponents and critics are 
concerned, it is a foregone conclusion that we have or can have causal 
explanations involving hard social conditions.254 
The persistent struggle over rotten-social-background defenses is, 
then, driven by the sense—common among criminal theorists—that we 
either have or will soon have satisfactory255 causal explanations linking 
                                                                                                                       
think that “disadvantaged backgrounds” cause crime by, among other things, cultivating “personality 
disorders.”  Id. at 394.  Falk notes that proponents of such defenses have made arguments for 
reduction of culpability based on causation alone, primarily though not exclusively in the sentencing 
context.  Falk, supra note 128, at 743–48. 
At some points, Bazelon uses formulations that might suggest a compatibilist rather than 
originationist orientation, insofar as he suggests we can distinguish between excusing and 
nonexcusing causes.  E.g., Bazelon, supra note 187, at 392–93.  Most likely, however, Bazelon is an 
originationist who accepts the degree-determinist premise (namely, that some acts are “more or less 
free” than others).  See MOORE, supra note 1, at 506–07 (characterizing Bazelon as a degree 
determinist). 
 248. The originationist nature of these claims is also recognized by noncompatibilists.  See, e.g., 
Corrado, supra note 8, at 475–76 (noting that rotten-social-background defenses are essentially 
originationist). 
 249. Morse, supra note 86, at 1653. 
 250. MOORE, supra note 1, at 545. 
 251. FLETCHER, supra note 54, at 801.  Of course, determinism is only a cul-de-sac if (1) 
originationism is true (such that all nonoriginal conduct must be excused), (2) absolute determinism 
is true (such that all conduct is nonoriginal), and (3) universal excuse is in some way analogous to a 
cul-de-sac.  While compatibilists attack the first proposition, the second and third are also vulnerable 
to attack.  See Kaye, supra note 3, at 1131–57 (describing challenges to second and third 
propositions). 
 252. Morse, supra note 2, at 140. 
 253. Morse, supra note 86, at 1653. 
 254. All the action in the debate about hard social-condition defenses is in the conflict between 
originationism and compatibilism. 
 255. Satisfactory, here, need not mean “genuinely complete.”  In our daily lives, most of us are 
willing to take detailed and intuitively plausible causal accounts of events (and acts) as 
satisfactory—for the purposes of both forward-looking prognostication and backward-looking 
explanation and moral judgment—even though our epistemic limits make it impossible for us to 
offer a genuinely complete causal account of any event or act.  Partial accounts become proxies for 
the whole. 
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hard social conditions to antisocial acts.256  In this light, criminal theory’s 
preference for compatibilist criminal law has political significance.  If we 
either have or will soon have the ability to generate social-causal 
explanations of antisocial acts in a significant set of cases, then the 
compatibilist criminal law either does now or will soon punish the 
disadvantaged at a higher rate than the originationist criminal law.  That 
is, the compatibilist criminal law either is now or will soon be a better 
ally to the existing social order.  It will be a better weapon for preventing 
the disadvantaged from acquiring the resources necessary for social 
mobility, and for quieting a pool of potentially vocal critics of the status 
quo. 
C. Conclusion 
Academic analysis of compatibilism rarely dwells on the theory’s 
distinctive political features, but when criminal theorists import 
compatibilism into criminal theory some political features of 
compatibilism are brought to the surface.  Ensconced as a critical cog in 
the machinery of the state, measuring and directing the state’s use of the 
punishment power, compatibilism shows itself to be a strong ally to the 
status quo.  As compared to the originationist alternative, it maximizes 
the state’s ability to deter challenges to the social order.  It does so both 
through ideological persuasion and through brute coercion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Compatibilism, I have argued, is not politically innocent—at least 
not when it takes up residence in the criminal law.  On the contrary, the 
compatibilist criminal law is a nice fit for a particular vision of the 
state—one in which the state is static and striated.  Such a criminal law 
disrupts popular scrutiny of the relationship between social conditions 
and crime, and thus makes it less likely that the suffering and costs 
inherent in the crime problem will lead us to criticize or challenge the 
existing status quo; and it gives the state extra leeway to use its coercive 
power against the disadvantaged—the very class with the most incentive 
to challenge the status quo.  In short, the compatibilist criminal law  
 
                                                     
 256. The same can be seen in the generally undeveloped assumption that we are close to causal 
explanations based on “abusive background” and “genetic constitution” concrete enough to register 
in an originationist criminal law.  See Corrado, supra note 3, at 1192 (discussing whether defenses 
based on such causal explanations make sense). 
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contributes to the calcification of a hierarchical social order in a way that 
the originationist criminal law does not. 
Uncovering this secret politics allows us to look at the compatibilist 
account of the criminal law in new ways.  For one thing, it gives us a 
new vantage on whether we really have a compatibilist criminal law at 
all.  On the one hand, we might think that the compatibilist criminal 
law’s political features are normatively unappealing: they overvalue 
stable social hierarchy and undervalue alleviation of the crime problem 
(at least to the extent that they largely avoid contemplation of the ways in 
which social change might serve this purpose).  While this may seem like 
a normative critique, it can also be cast as a critique of the descriptive 
claim: perhaps it is implausible that we would embrace a criminal law 
with this particular set of preferences.  On the other hand, we might 
argue that the compatibilist criminal law’s political features should be 
instrumentally appealing to social elites, insofar as the compatibilist 
criminal law is better suited than the originationist criminal law to 
preserve the social hierarchy and especially elite privilege.  If we also 
take the view that the criminal law is created primarily by the most 
advantaged, we will find it entirely plausible that the criminal law adopts 
a theory of desert that serves to shore up the status of the social elite.257  
On this view, the descriptive claim that we have a compatibilist criminal 
law gains plausibility. 
This political critique leads to other, broader insights too.  Seeing the 
politics behind the compatibilist account of the criminal law should 
remind us that our actual criminal justice institutions are themselves 
products of a political culture; and seeing this should remind us that our 
political culture is not pure and single-minded, but irreducibly pluralistic.  
If there is compatibilism in our criminal law, it is probably there in 
service (at least in part) to a certain politics; but if this is true, it is also 
probably true that there are other, competing threads in our criminal law, 
traceable (at least in part) to other, competing politics.  As messy and 
conflicted as any other human institution, our criminal law likely has 
both compatibilist and originationist tendencies (alongside other 
overlapping and competing tendencies).  This is why it is so difficult to 
prove we have a compatibilist criminal law, and this is why it is so 
difficult to prove we have an originationist criminal law.  In fact, we 
have neither—because we have both.  In our criminal law, irreconcilable 
compatibilist and originationist intuitions are intertwined. 
                                                     
 257. See NORRIE, supra note 70, at 110 (self-serving “political interventions of the social élite” 
have played a critical role in shaping the law’s “principles of responsibility”). 
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If this is true, then claims that we have a compatibilist criminal law 
can be understood as efforts to elevate one of the criminal law’s many 
jumbled tendencies (compatibilism) at the expense of others (like 
originationism), and this effort can be seen as driven by a particular 
politics.  Seeing this—seeing the politics that lurks behind one contestant 
in the competition between theories of criminal responsibility—should 
clear the way for a more frankly political debate about criminal 
responsibility generally.  In this reoriented debate, disputants will, of 
course, say what their preferred criteria for punishment are, but they 
should also say more.  They should say, for example, whom their criteria 
will punish, and whom will be spared, identifying the punished not just 
in the politically opaque language of responsibility and desert, but also 
by reference to their role and status in the social order.  They should say 
how application of their punishment criteria will influence the allocation 
of resources and power in society.  And they should say why we should 
desire or approve a society that allocates resources and power in the way 
they recommend. 
The political critique offered in this Article makes a start on that 
project: it contends that the compatibilist account of the criminal law 
resonates with an unappealing politics.  The compatibilist criminal law 
seems to favor the status quo and the socially advantaged over social 
change and the disadvantaged.  It diverts our attention from the causes of 
important social problems (the crime problem), and thus makes us less 
likely to solve those problems and less likely to have the society we 
actually want.  In short, it prefers social rigor mortis over social mobility, 
and turns a blind eye to hard social conditions—and hard social 
problems—rather than facilitating change.  These, I propose, are 
unappealing features for a criminal law.  They suggest we ought not to 
let the originationist thread in our criminal law fall out. 
 
